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Perspectives from the Baltic 
and Nordic War Colleges
PREFACE
At the annual meeting of the Nordic Chief Education Officers in Stockholm in Oc-
tober 2005 the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College was asked to ar-
range a one-day symposium on trends and traditions in war studies in the Baltic and 
Nordic colleges. The underlying motivation was to chart the prospects for future 
cooperation and, eventually, coordination between the colleges in this field of study, 
tutoring and teaching. The impetus also arises from the fact that the Baltic and Nor-
dic colleges represent a mixed array of competence in and traditions of war studies 
in a small-state perspective. Furthermore, this might contribute to improving the 
teaching programmes in our countries. Last but not least, this collaborative ambi-
tion flows from a long-standing liaison between the Baltic and Nordic countries that 
has resulted in exchanges of cadets and teaching staff.
There are several fundamental questions that we wish to address, such as What is 
“war studies” and are there national variations? How do the Baltic and Nordic war 
colleges deal with the discipline in terms of institutionalisation and academisation, 
and how is “war studies” taught? To what extent are there differences and similari-
ties between the teaching programmes a result of the academic status of the colleges 
within the national educational systems?
These were the core questions that constituted the theme of the symposium that 
was held in Oslo 24 October 2006 as part of the larger Meeting of the Nordic Chief 
Education Officers. Although one should not be surprised to find that the discipline 
of war studies is dealt with differently, it gives me a certain amount of satisfaction 
that none of the colleges claim to have found the Holy Grail. Certainty of knowledge 
in such a complex field might be the surest sign of decline.
I hope this anthology will inaugurate a Baltic-Nordic tradition of joint publications 
on military topics with a bearing on education. The present volume shows that there 
are national differences in the acceptance of the term war studies. Moreover, it de-
monstrates that there are different approaches, both in the substance and in the cur-
rent struggle of institutionalisation and academisation of what military practitioners 
so often refer to as the business of action rather than thinking. This anthology will 
hopefully provide some insight into the status and challenges of war studies at the 
war colleges in the Baltic and Nordic countries, which then might provide the basis 
for cooperation and improvement over time as the countries continue to meet to 
exchange ideas on how to educate military officers.
Arne Røksund
Rear Admiral
Commandant of the Norwegian Defence Education Command
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Wars have occurred from the beginning of recorded time and in all parts of the 
world: on an institutional scale, they have shaped the international system and 
promoted social change, and on a more personal scale, wars have provided some 
of the most intense as well as harrowing of human experiences. Although war is 
probably the most brutalising of human affairs, it has always been an insepara-
ble part of the evolution of mankind. Paradoxically, wars bring out the best at 
the same time as they bring out the worst in people. Given the impact of war on 
humans, society and state it is worthy of studying, but the question is how?
Wars can be studied in terms of experience, that is, what is the common 
experience to be derived from wars as diverse as the Napoleonic wars and the 
genocides in Rwanda and Darfur? Or one could focus on the causes of war, be it 
from a biological standpoint in accordance with Charles Darwin’s theory of evo-
lution or from a geopolitical standpoint in accordance with Friedrich Ratzel’s 
view of the state as a living organism that grows, matures, decays and dies. 
Yet another angle is to study war and the evolution of military establishments, 
whether one adheres to the liberal theory of industrial society, Marxism or the 
“neo-Machiavellian” paradigm. Or one could study war’s interaction with tech-
nology and the ensuing results on operational art. From a more philosophical 
venture one can distinguish between the science of war and the art of war; one 
can also distinguish between what constitutes merely a battle, what amounts to 
a campaign and what justifies being termed a proper war.
There is also the ethics of war and there are judicial aspects that should be 
explored when seeking to comprehend the phenomenon of war, most obviously 
in terms of ad bellum, in bello and post bellum. One can also explore wars in 
terms of their intensity, such as shock and awe or attrition, or in terms of their 
geographical stretch: from total war to limited war to military operations other 
than war. How to approach war studies in terms of methodology opens yet 
another door of challenges.
In the current international situation military power encompasses much 
more than traditional war fighting. Military power is increasingly used to bring 
about conflict resolution, to guard peace accords, to relieve humanitarian disas-
ters, to put political pressure on conflicting parties, and to secure national juris-
diction over territories and resources. The list of non-traditional uses of military 
power could be made much longer, and strong political provisions normally 
accompany it. The unrelenting need for conventional war preparations in com-
bination with the need to prepare for alternative deployments of military force 
poses an overwhelming challenge for those concerned with the education of of-
ficers and military theory. This constant need for rethinking a variety of military 
issues, while at the same time preserve competence in traditional military theory 
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and history has lead to many ways of teaching and developing this field of study. 
When representatives of the Baltic and Nordic staff colleges convene, they do so 
also with a run of the mill backdrop, namely the process of reform and adoption 
to current problems in military education.
Although there are inevitably many different ways to approach the study of 
war, the discipline itself is arguably the most important in the education of mili-
tary officers. The discipline, despite its obvious importance, is still in its infancy 
in both academic and military circles in the Baltic and Nordic countries.
John Andreas Olsen and Tom Kristiansen, Oslo, March 2007.
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MILITARy STUDIES: DE qUOI S’AGIT-IL?
Lieutenant Colonels John Andreas Olsen and Lars Magnus Eriksson 
Department of Strategic Studies
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College
PROLOGUE
One of the sayings that have come down the centuries, from the time of Rome, 
is “Si vis pacem, para bellum”: if you seek peace, prepare for war. Expressed 
liberally, this could be taken to mean that if the individual and society want to 
have a peaceful world, then it is incumbent upon that individual and society to 
seek to understand the phenomenon of war. 
A proper understanding of war, ranging from a duel between two infantry-
men to the atomic bomb, should begin with defining the relationship between 
ends, ways and means, in which ends is the objective (total victory, conditional 
victory, stalemate, not losing, etc); ways the pursued strategy (military power, 
diplomacy, economic sanctions, etc); and means the resources available (people, 
weapons, money etc).1 If one is to believe Carl von Clausewitz, one should also 
distinguish between war’s logic (nature of war) and war’s grammar (conduct of 
war). In Vietnam, to illustrate this point, it could be argued that American soldi-
ers did their job, but the US political leadership failed to do its: the North Viet-
namese Army did not defeat the US military forces in the field. In other words, 
the grammar was right, but the logic was wrong.2 To complicate matters further 
one would be well advised to follow Edward N. Luttwak’s proposition, that the 
entire realm of war is pervaded by a paradoxical logic of its own, a logic that can 
only be comprehended if one accounts for the human dimension of uncertainty, 
fog and friction at the same time as one systematically approaches war on its 
four levels: the strategic, operational, tactical and technical.3 
These four levels of war, with the human dimension at its core, when seen 
in the context of the relationship between ends, ways and means and the distinc-
tion between war’s logic and grammar, can help officers to better understand the 
phenomenon of war, whether one finds the Roman dictum to be true or false. 
1 Alan Stephens and Nicola Baker, Making Sense of War: Strategy for the 21st Century 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1–13.
2 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Toward An American Way of War”, Strategic Studies 
Institute, March 2004, pp. 10–11.
3 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987). 
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The subject of this paper is the impasse of military studies at the Norwe-
gian Defence Command and Staff College (NODCSC).4 The first part deals with 
the question of why it is necessary for military officers to engage in military 
studies and why it is necessary for them to have their own colleges that deal 
with the subject rather than rely on academic courses provided by civilian uni-
versities. The short answer to the first question is that military officers need a 
reasoned understanding about war as a basis for improving ability in war. The 
short answer to the second question is that officers belong to a unique profes-
sion that demands special attention, a profession that is distinct in four ways: it 
is collective rather than associational; it serves the state; its members are subject 
to being lawfully ordered into harm’s way; and there is a disciplinary system 
separate from the civil code. These elements distinguish the military profession 
from other professions so fundamentally that separate command and staff col-
leges are required. Thus, this paper argues that the skills and core values needed 
for officership are best developed at military colleges where soldiers, sailors and 
airmen get the opportunity to meet colleagues in a joint and international envi-
ronment, tailor-made with a mix of academics and experienced military staff; 
however, in an attempt to make military studies academe one must never forget 
that it is first and foremost the conduct of military operations – the grammar of 
war – that shapes the identity and ethos of the armed forces, individually and 
collectively. With this backbone in mind, the second part of this paper is descrip-
tive and sets out the structure and substance of the master’s degree programme 
in military studies at the NODCSC.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARy STUDIES AND MILITARy COLLEGES
The terminology “war studies” has not been used at military institutions in 
Norway until recently, but war and its various subgroups have been studied 
for a long time under terms such as military theory, military thinking, strategic 
studies, military history, doctrinal studies, leadership & management, command 
& control and operational art. This is not the place for semantics, but when 
the NODCSC opened its new master’s degree programme in 2006 the term 
“military studies” was preferred and its focus was, as in the Swedish model, 
knowledge and expertise about war and ability and skill in war; where the first 
part is a basic condition for the latter. Moreover, both countries emphasise that 
an understanding of war and the use of force requires an appreciation of the 
4 In response to the Bologna Process which began in 1998, a Quality Reform was launched 
in Norway in 2001. It introduced bachelor, master and PhD degrees generally following 
a 3-year+2-year+3-year model. The new degrees superseded the old Norwegian university 
system. The Quality Reform also introduced a concept to establish stricter quality 
mechanisms in higher education, which resulted in the founding of an independent agency 
for quality assurance in education – the Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in 
Education (NOKUT). In the process the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College 
was given the accreditation to run a two-year master of art programme in military studies, 
starting in the autumn of 2005. 
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dynamic relationship between the abstract and the institutional; the interaction 
between the state, society and the military. Such an understanding makes for 
possibilities, because only by combining theories and experiences will political 
decision-makers and the executive branch of soldiering have a chance to use 
the military instrument with desired effect in a given situation, at the same 
time as such an understanding of war does not afford guarantee against error: 
every state has fought the wrong war, at some point in time, or it has fought 
war the wrong way and paid accordingly. This is an important warning to all 
who fall in love with nice theories: military studies cannot provide guarantee or 
immunity against error and defeat, but it alone offers the possibility of properly 
understanding the nature of the war in which a state is engaged, and the nature 
of the enemy. Dr H.P. Willmott summarizes the caveats of wars studies along 
the following lines:
Study, even the most careful and deliberate of study, cannot afford guarantee 
against error of omission and commission, but without study the danger of mis-
takes that could and perhaps should have been avoided come to centre stage: 
proper and professional study necessarily provides the basis of considered, de-
liberate action that, hopefully, would ensure the proper understanding of the 
nature of the conflict in hand and the proper application of the military instru-
ment in terms of the designation of reasoned and reasonable aim and the correct 
appreciation of the limitation of force.5
Since the military profession is one that requires the combination of multidis-
cipline research and proven practice, through the lens of an understanding about 
war and ability in war, it makes sense to have separate military colleges that 
focus on particular elements of higher learning. Only in a military academy, 
where there is a meeting of academe and services, can the military professional 
find the range of depth of knowledge relating to the international system, world, 
regional and national histories, economics, technology and operational skills 
and experiences needed in the process of preparing himself for whatever even-
tuality may arise. There is this element of hands-on training in the sense that 
the profession is a profession – academe can provide perspective, but it cannot 
provide the basis of military professionalism. Civilian institutions and personnel 
by definition lack the commitment, obligation and ethos of the military; they do 
not understand the nature of formation, unit and individual limitation (e.g. the 
difficulty of moving a formation and unit when the individual soldier is obliged 
to make a parachute jump, march eighty kilometres and then take up position) 
while military personnel do not have the time – and in too many cases the will 
– to undertake wide-ranging and deep study. It is therefore imperative for armed 
5 H.P. Willmott, discussion with authors, 8 November 2006.
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forces to have their own colleges for higher military learning, an environment 
where special needs are met, rather than to rely on courses that are academe 
only in their focus: in short, the military college is essential because only it can 
provide the combination of education and professional training.
An understanding of history is important, for all the obvious reasons, but 
historical awareness needs to stand alongside thorough professional training and 
preparedness and an awareness of contemporary relevance in order to provide 
value and meaning. For example, in The New Wars Professor Herfried Münkler 
argues that today’s wars, typically characterised by non-state actors, asymmetry 
and the blurring between soldiers and civilians, have more in common with the 
Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) than the inter-state wars of the 20th century. By 
reading about the Thirty Years’ War officers might be better prepared for the 
challenges of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2006 than if they study the Great War, the 
Second World War or the Gulf War of 1991. However, it is only when officers 
translate the academic knowledge into operational art through teaching, semi-
nars and exercises that learning becomes truly relevant. To put it bluntly, what 
distinguishes a civilian university from a military college is that for the latter war 
studies are essential in order to render present planning and future intent rele-
vant. Such a requirement means that military colleges should not teach history 
for its own sake, however interesting and tempting that might be, but rather 
focus on the implications and consequences it has for the military profession. 
The important link between knowledge and skills in the context of the mi-
litary profession is the basis for our definition of military studies:
Military studies are the studies of war from psychological, sociological, histo-
rical, technological, operational and political perspectives; with the overall aim 
to develop the professional knowledge and skills needed to develop available 
resources into military capabilities and to conduct military operations in the 
best possible way.
It is possible to have a more philosophical and abstract approach to the topic, 
but our view is that this approach is well suited for our military profession.
THE MILITARy PROFESSION: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR
In the study of war there are elements of constancy and change that are at odds 
with one another. It is worth stating that “revolutions in military affairs” have 
often been associated with technological change, but no single development in 
itself changes the terms of reference of war or the conduct of operations. The 
introduction of a new weapon to the battlefield is always evolutionary, involving 
as it must the recognition of the need for this weapon, its production and the 
development of organisation and doctrine that govern its employment: to bor-
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row an observation, technology alone does not make a revolution.6 Willmott is 
of course right when he warns that the West is seriously at fault if it believes that 
wars can be controlled simply because it has state-of-the-art technology:
The experience of twentieth century warfare would suggest that the ability of 
any single nation or associated group of nations to control the terms of reference 
of war is illusory: as Clausewitz had taught us, in war everything is uncertain, 
and wars invariably assume courses and outcomes very different from that in-
tended by their authors. The whole notion of being able to control warfare, 
whether it be definition of “end-state” or offensive operations of surgical pre-
cision, runs directly counter to the fundamental Clausewitzian element in war 
– chance. War is not the preserve of the intellect and is not intrinsically rational 
or scientific. Man made War in his own image, complete with all the elements of 
human failure, misjudgement and incompetence therein, and, hopefully, thus it 
will remain. Current doctrine and predictions for the future of war that are now 
on the table would seem to assume otherwise – that somehow the certainties 
provided by technology will provide certainties in the conduct of war that will 
in themselves transform the nature of war.7
However, Sir General Rupert Smith is also right when he suggests that some-
times the sum of changes amount to a shift of paradigms in warfare:
War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all 
around the world – most noticeably, but not only, in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Palestinian Territories – and states still 
have armed forces which they use as a symbol of power. None the less, war as 
cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men 
and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international af-
fairs: such war no longer exists … 
It is now time to recognize that a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly oc-
curred: from armies with comparable forces doing battle on a field to strategic 
confrontation between a range of combatants, not all of which are armies, and 
using different types of weapons, often improvised. The old paradigm was that 
of interstate industrial war. The new one is the paradigm of war amongst the 
people.8
6 H.P. Willmott, When Men Lost Faith in Reason: Reflections on War and Society in the 
Twentieth Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p. 14.
7 H.P. Willmott, discussion with authors, 8 November 2006.
8 General (ret.) Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern 
World (London: Penguin, 2005), pp. 1–3.
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Professor Christopher Coker argues along some of the same lines when he sug-
gests that the concept of war changed considerably with Operation Allied For-
ce:
The Kosovo War was not without bloodshed, but the air campaign against 
Serbia involved far fewer casualties than any similar conflict in history, and a 
ground war was avoided. Humanitarianism, it would seem, is not just an objec-
tive. Western societies can now fight wars which minimise human suffering, that 
of their enemies’ as well as their own.
...
For the moment, the West is still in the war business but it is attempting to 
change its nature by fighting wars more humanely. Post-material societies fight 
post-material wars – they try to avoid the material (human and environmental) 
damage which was essential to warfare for two millennia. They are intent on 
sanitising war, on purging it of those elements which, through once familiar and 
accepted without question, now cast it in a light that is offensive to the liberal 
conscience.9
Coker warns that the West’s quest for humane warfare – humanism and war, hu-
manity and war, and humanitarian wars – may become its burden because it at-
tempts to remove chance, hatred, courage and emotions from war, thus making 
war into something it cannot be. If the West is trying to eliminate these elements 
from war, removing human operators from their actions through technology, at 
the same time as their enemy follows different rules, Coker suggests that war 
may become ever more inhumane. 
If one accepts Rupert Smith’s and Coker’s arguments, that war no longer 
exists as cognitively known to most non-combatants, then one must accept that 
it has implications for what kind of officers armed forces need. Moving from 
classic home-defence to participating in a broad spectrum of conflicts, someti-
mes thousands of kilometres from home, requires renewed thinking about what 
kind of experience, responsibility, identity and ethos officers should have. At a 
minimum the emergence of the “humane soldier” or “humane warrior” is new 
to the Western world and the ethos of the military profession has changed signi-
ficantly: the qualities required for peacekeeping and peace enforcement are very 
different from traditional home defence.
The consequence is that there is a renewed interest in defining the military 
profession and describing the demands, skills and ethics associated with it. The 
raison d’étre for the military profession has therefore shifted from the defence 
of national territory, waters and space to the defence of interests more vaguely 
defined. Interests often defined as to have a seat at the table in relevant forums, 
9 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 2, 3.
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something that might be achieved by contributing to a permanent alliance or 
an ad-hoc coalition. This means that the value base for officers as a whole has 
shifted, or must shift, from idealism and nationalism to professionalism, where 
the codex or ethos of the profession becomes ever more essential. The complex 
conflicts in highly nuanced political situations, sophisticated weaponry, revo-
lution in information technology and unprecedented public scrutiny are also 
factors that set new demands on military professionalism. Again, to restate the 
major argument of this paper, the character of new wars, campaigns and opera-
tions require a revisiting of what the military profession is all about, and there 
is no real alternative to an arena such as a one- or two-year programme at the 
command and staff college in which officers from all services come together in 
an academic setting to discuss their experience, challenge each other’s views on 
leadership and stimulate each other intellectually through lectures, seminars, 
group-work and individual studies.
THE MILITARy PROFESSION: ATTRIBUTES AND CHARACTERISTICS
In order to identify the characteristics of a profession one might look to the Ca-
nadian Defence Forces and their document Duty with Honour:
A profession is an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a systema-
tically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive research, education, 
training and experience. Members of a profession have a special responsibility 
to fulfil their function competently and objectively for the benefit of society. Pro-
fessionals are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct 
while defining and regulating their work. This code of ethics is enforced by the 
members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate 
by society at large.10
A profession has as such four attributes: expertise, responsibility, identity and 
vocational ethics. Expertise describes the body of abstract theoretical and practi-
cally achieved knowledge possessed by the members of the profession, the effort 
to develop the skills needed and the aim for perfection. Responsibility acknow-
ledges the profession’s special duty to society and the members’ responsibility 
for the development and status of the profession itself. Identity reflects the mem-
bers’ unique standing within society and their identification with the profession 
and the pride they put in being part of it. And finally, vocational ethics express 
the particular values and obligations that form the foundation of the profession, 
underpinning and binding it together, often called its ethos. For the military 
10 The definition is from the Canadian Defence Force’s Duty With Honour: The Military 
Profession In Canada, Chief of Defence Staff by the Canadian Academy (Canadian 
Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), p. 6.
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profession in Norway we call these vocational ethics or ethos “verdigrunnlag,” 
which can be translated into core values.
Figure 1 highlights the critical role of the military ethos in unifying the other 
professional attributes of the profession of arms. The military ethos reflects how 
military professionals fulfil their function (expertise), how they relate to their 
government and to society (responsibility) and how they view themselves (iden-
tity).
When discussing the military profession it is useful to revisit the most-
quoted writer on the topic. Although Samuel Huntington wrote his major work 
The Soldier and the State around the middle of the 20th century, he is still widely 
quoted by researchers and institutions of higher learning. Huntington’s funda-
mental position was that “the modern officer corps is a professional body and 
the modern military officer a professional man.” Huntington argues next that 
the military is a profession because the specialized expertise of the military of-
ficer is the management of violence. In his own words:
The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary 
function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer … The 
expertise of the officer imposes upon him a special social responsibility … his 
responsibility is the military security of his client, society … the officer corps 
alone is responsible for military security to the exclusion of all other ends … The 
legal right to practice the profession is limited to members of a carefully defined 
body … The functional imperatives of security give rise to complex vocational 
institutions which mould the officer corps into an autonomous social unit.11
11 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 11–17.
Figure 1: The attributes of the military profession
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A military profession is equal to other professions in that its members develop 
and apply specific skills derived from a theory-based body of knowledge; per-
form their function competently and objectively for the benefit of something 
bigger than the individual; regulate their conduct through value-based codes of 
ethics; and ensure that their roles and standards are accepted as legitimate by 
society. Added to this, however, is the fact that the profession of arms has four 
distinct characteristics, as alluded to but not explained in the prologue.
Firstly, it is a collective profession rather than an associational one. In an 
associational profession, members can function independently as is usually the 
case with the medical or legal professions. In collective professions, no indivi-
dual or even a subgroup of individuals can accomplish the ends sought; rather, it 
is the collective as a whole that acts. This means that values such as team spirit 
and unselfishness, and the conduct and development of leadership, will always 
be of utmost importance.
Secondly, the profession of arms serves the state. Armed forces in western 
democracies are subordinate to the elected civil authority and prohibited from 
operating outside boundaries that have been very carefully defined over hun-
dreds of years. In essence, armed forces are the creation of the state and act as 
an arm of the elected government. Therefore, the military professional does not 
practise his or her profession outside the organisational structure of the armed 
forces. This factor implies that the military professional must understand first, 
the political system, second, its relationship with the military system, and, third, 
the role of the military profession in society at large. The state and the military 
are complementary and depend on one another: the state possesses the sole right 
to raise military organisations. The military, by definition, is a very tightly dis-
ciplined profession, dependent on the state for the definition of its primary aims 
and objectives and answerable to the state in terms of its organisation, funding 
and conduct of operations. It is within this realm one must realize that states 
wage war, services fight and individuals witness combat. 
Thirdly, members of the military profession accept that they are subject 
to being lawfully ordered into harm’s way under conditions that could lead to 
the loss of their lives. This underpins the necessity of discipline, identified core 
values and high ethical standards. It also explains the necessity and the nature 
of, and the emphasis put on, Command and Control in the military system. The 
authority and mandate given by various forms of command, the responsibilities 
this brings about and the hard work to conduct it as effectively as possible are 
key elements in the military profession.
Lastly, soldiers, sailors and airmen have a duty to obey orders: if they do 
not obey legal orders they can be subject to disciplinary sanctions; and if they 
do not behave in accordance with their code of conduct they can be subject 
to disciplinary sanctions. Consequently, military personnel cannot obey orders 
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blindly, but the point to be made is that the armed forces have a military discipli-
nary system that works separately from the civic one. The command system that 
one finds in the military is based on disciplinary elements that are very different 
from other professions: soldiers, sailors and airmen, whose task is to protect the 
freedom of fellow citizens, do not have the same personal freedom and right to 
privacy as their civilian countrymen, at the same time as they are exempt from 
some of the nominal individual liability acts.
The mentioned attributions of a military profession (expertise, responsi-
bility, identity and ethos), combined with an understanding of the distinct cha-
racteristics of the military profession (collectiveness, servicing the state, can be 
ordered into harm’s way and a military disciplinary code) provide the basis for 
how to design a proper master’s degree programme in military studies.
MA IN MILITARy STUDIES: PURPOSE AND PERSPECTIVES
For the above mentioned reasons, the master’s degree programme in milita-
ry studies at the NODCSC is a profession based study. This means that the 
NODCSC’s main responsibility is to provide the Norwegian Defence Force with 
leaders who can meet contemporary and future challenges. Adhering to the dual 
purpose of military studies (developing knowledge about war in order to im-
prove ability in war), the NODCSC emphasises that military operations are the 
overriding purpose of the military profession, a view that shapes the educational 
programme. This is the main reason why the NODCSC has chosen the under-
standing and conduct of joint operations to be its core activity. This is also the 
reason for the master’s degree operating in the span between the particular and 
the general, and the rationale for discussing issues such as the potential and 
limitation of military power, command and control and operational art in light 
of three overlapping and mutually supporting perspectives: the philosophical, 
social and scientific. 
Figure 2: Methodological perspectives
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These three scholarly perspectives (figure 2), coupled with the required attri-
butes of the military profession (figure 1), provide the bases for content and 
methods used in the master’s degree programme. 
First, expertise is developed through comprehensive studies in classic and 
contemporary military theory, military history, leadership, command and con-
trol and the study of and training in joint operations. As mentioned, the conduct 
of military operations is the core of the military profession; for that reason alone 
the joint operation course is the college’s core activity. Second, the programme 
stresses the interaction between political decision makers, the population and 
the military’s responsibility to serve and protect, including ethical and judicial 
perspectives. Third, the programme emphasises the identity of the individual 
and the officer corps. A master’s degree programme at a military college, carried 
out with colleagues in a joint and international environment, and conducted by 
a mix of academics and experienced military staff, contributes to the pride and 
sense of uniqueness of the profession. The core values for professional soldiers, 
sailors and airmen are also emphasised, that is, the students become ever more 
aware of what holds the three attributes together – ethos. It is in this realm that 
the uniqueness of the profession comes to centre stage: it is a collective profes-
sion; it is a profession that serves the state; a profession in which officers and 
men can be ordered into harm’s way; and a profession that has its own discipli-
nary system. 
With this baseline in mind, the question on how to design a programme 
for military studies becomes one of emphasis: what kind of balance should the 
programme have between theory and practice (exercise); to what extent should 
one focus on ways (strategy) compared to means and ends; how should one 
divide the time between the strategic, operational, tactical and technical levels 
of war; how should one approach the logic of war vs. the grammar of war; 
and what kind of balance should we have between sub-topics such as military 
theory, strategic studies, operational art, international politics, leadership, ma-
nagement, methodology, and, perhaps the most difficult of all, matters dealing 
with command and control?
MA IN MILITARy STUDIES: THE CURRICULUM
The Norwegian two-year MA programme contains nine separate modules, to-
talling 120 credit points, but before each of the modules are presented three 
facts are worthy of mentioning upfront. First, the command and staff college 
is truly joint, with roughly equal representation from all three services, and 
with exchange officers from other countries. Second, the normal command and 
staff college course is one year; the follow-on year is only for those who seek a 
master’s degree. Third, the students are carefully divided into joint groups on 
the first day of school, groups to which they will belong during the whole year. 
The individual’s group is the engine-room for both the traditional command and 
20 OSLO FILES ON DefeNCe aND SeCurITy 2/2007 War STuDIeS
staff college course and the master’s degree programme and is used for discus-
sions, in-depth studies and sometimes examinations. 
The first semester starts with “Scientific Theory and Methodology” in ear-
ly August. The module gives five credit points with the aim of developing the 
students’ understanding of various research related approaches within social, 
methodical and historical studies, thus developing competence within critical 
evaluation of sources, models, assertions and argumentations. Scientifically the-
oretical foundation concepts are emphasised as well as theoretical approaches 
that describe the limitations of the use of models and methods within science, 
leadership and ethics. There is also focus on developing skills in the writing of 
scientific papers. This course provides some basic tools that the students develop 
and improve over time.





The Utility of Military 
Force in Complex 
Conflicts
(10 credits)
The Applicability of 
Military Force in Joint 
Operations























The second module is “Leadership”. The aim of the module is to lay the founda-
tion for a personal development that will provide the Armed Forces with modern 
leaders with a high degree of self-consciousness as a person and as a military 
leader. This takes place through lectures, organised discussions, activities and 
feedback that give the student a framework for personal development towards a 
transformational leadership style. The module gives five credit points and can be 
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seen as an introduction to topics such as responsibility, command and control, 
and accountability. Students also draft their own Leadership philosophy.12
 The third module, “Military History, Military Thinking and Technology,” 
starts in early October. The module gives ten credit points and provides an un-
derstanding of the relationship between formative conditions for military po-
wer. The students gain knowledge and insight into the fundamentals of military 
history since 1815, and the main subjects of military theory. The students are 
introduced to the most influential military theorists regarding land, sea and air 
power, and the development of joint theory and doctrines. The course has inte-
grated aspects of technology, ethics and international law, and their influence in 
the development of military thinking. Military traditions and security challenges 
regarding small nations are dealt with as well.
The fourth module is also at the core of war studies. “Norwegian and 
International Politics” allows for ten credit-points and has as its basic premise 
that Norwegian defence and security policy cannot be seen separately from the 
international context. The role played by military means in Norwegian and in-
ternational politics pervades both the literature and cases discussed. The stu-
dents are introduced to different theoretical approaches in international politics. 
Focus is given to the decision-making process leading to the use of military 
force. Furthermore, how political considerations both on a national as well as 
on an international level influence the application of military means are emp-
hasised. Particular attention is given to power politics, international law, ethics 
and technology.
With this theoretical basis the students take their Christmas break, and 
when returning they start on the fifth module, “Joint Operations.” The twenty-
credit module gives the students a thorough understanding of how political and 
military strategic aims are translated into military plans. In both planning and 
execution of military joint operations, an understanding of ethics, law of armed 
conflicts and the importance of cultural aspects is being emphasised. Basic un-
derstanding of service capacities is utilized and developed by enhancing the stu-
dents’ knowledge about how the services can contribute to achieve joint goals. 
This module is the core activity at our command and staff college. Considerable 
recourses and efforts are put into this module. This module makes our com-
mand and staff college uniquely different from any civilian university, for here 
theory and practice come together, operational leadership and logistics come 
into play, and the whole exercise requires the experience that our students al-
ready have from international operations and a long career in our armed forces. 
The module is joint, combined and inter-agency oriented. The module includes 
12 There will be some changes for the academic year of 2007/2008. The Leadership 
module (5 credit points) will be deleted, and consequently, more time will be given 
to “Joint Operations”, while “Norwegian and International Politics” and “Defence 
Resource Management” will give 12,5 credit points each.
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numerous case studies and two extensive exercises conducted in a real life head-
quarters environment. Individuals from the outside, from relevant ministries 
and non-governmental organisations are used in the teaching and incorporated 
into the exercises. The module also includes a study trip where headquarters at 
different levels are visited, with the purpose of enabling the students to get an 
increased understanding of challenges and possibilities associated with being in 
an alliance or a coalition.
The sixth module, the one that ends the second semester, focuses on mana-
gement rather than leadership per se, and it allows for ten credit-points. “Defen-
ce Resource Management” aims at giving the students relevant knowledge wit-
hin defence related strategy, business economics, human resource management 
and logistics. The rationale for this particular module is the expectation that the 
students become better contributors in their future role as managers and deci-
sion makers through a better understanding of how to effectively allocate hu-
man and material resources. The module examines contemporary management 
systems and models, with an emphasis on transformation and the challenges of 
developing and using capabilities in the most effective way.
These six modules, sixty credit points, constitute the command and staff 
college course. Those students who are enlisted for the full master’s degree pro-
gramme, return after the summer break to complete three more modules and 
write a master’s thesis. 
The third semester starts with a module called “The Utility of Military 
Force in Complex Conflicts.” This module focuses on current conflicts, empha-
sising contemporary changes in the character of war. The ten-credit module is 
divided into four themes: the essence of terrorism and asymmetric warfare; ethi-
cal and judicial aspects of intervention in contemporary conflicts; civil-military 
cooperations (theory and case studies); and finally how these three themes are of 
relevance to the Nordic region. 
Next, the students focus on “Research Methodology.” Building on the first-
term module “Scientific Theory and Methodology”, this ten-credit module goes 
more into depth, focusing on what will become each student’s master thesis. It 
discusses a selection of fundamental issues of social science and historical meth-
odology as well as the ethics of scientific inquiry. The module’s main emphasis 
is on qualitative approaches, but students in cooperation with their academic ad-
visor may make adjustments to the reading list in accordance with their choice 
of methodological approach for the master’s thesis. 
Having completed this module the students are divided into three groups. 
While all modules so far have been mandatory, the students now specialise to-
wards one of three subjects. In many cases, although not all, the students choose 
the ten-credit module that will strengthen their knowledge within the topic they 
have chosen for their master’s thesis.
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The first optional module is “The Applicability of Military Force in Joint 
Operations.” It contributes to the development of a deeper theoretical insight 
into challenges related to the use of military force. It emphasises new and alter-
native perspectives in regard to planning and the conduct of operations. The 
students develop a deeper understanding of perspectives within joint operations, 
especially in regard to current operations and likely future operations. The stu-
dents develop an understanding of military theory, joint functions such as com-
mand and control, intelligence, special operations, information operations and 
logistics. The students conduct an independent analysis of a joint function (case 
study) or the use of effects based approach related to joint operations and cam-
paigns. The students also critically analyse new trends within the development 
of joint operations, concepts and doctrine on the operational level of war. 
The second optional module is “Defence Strategic Management.” This spe-
cialization aims at improving the students’ grasp of central strategic management 
trade-offs, building intuition of what are good strategic processes and results. 
It does so by using management flight simulators, lectures and discussions. A 
recurring theme is the use of strategic management concepts demonstrably ena-
bling significant and cross-the-board defence performance improvements. The 
topic contrasts current Defence Force Planning practice, in particular Structural 
Planning, with various value configuration theories such as Value Chains, Value 
Shops and Value Networks. In particular, the programme presents a new Hybrid; 
a development model for defence strategic management. Various other central 
management subtopics are presented, such as corporate risk management, ba-
lanced score cards, project management and decision theories. 
The third optional module, “The Military, Politics and Society,” is an 
introduction to military sociology. It takes as its point of departure the classic 
theories of civil-military relations propounded by Samuel Huntington and 
Morris Janowitz. These are applied to certain historical and contemporary test 
cases, such as German militarism, third-world military dictatorships and recent 
Norwegian experiences of overseas operations. Half of the course is devoted to 
present-day developments which were unforeseen when the two basic studies 
were written more than forty years ago: the professionalization, privatization and 
feminization of military forces; their use in overseas peacekeeping operations; 
relations with the media and NGOs; and confrontations with non-state adversa-
ries. These trends are interpreted in the light of recent literature on “post-modern 
militaries”. The main objective of the course is to heighten awareness of the 
changing nature of civil-military relations in the age of globalisation.
Finally, the fourth semester is a semester where the students are given time 
to conduct research and to write their thesis. The paper equals thirty credit 
points and is in most cases supervised by staff at the Norwegian Defence Educa-
tion Command, the umbrella organisation for the Command and Staff College.
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CONCLUSION
It might be suggested that the profession of arms is a profession of paradoxes: 
not only are lives at stake, the profession of arms is the only one in which the 
individual can take a series of decisions, every one of which is correct, and at the 
same time still get himself and his comrades killed. Still, if officers better under-
stand the relationship between ends, ways and means, the distinction between 
the logic of war and the grammar of war, and the four levels of war with their 
own peculiarities, then we are hopefully better prepared for not only winning 
battles, but actually winning the peace for which the battles are fought. There 
is no better way to get intellectually agile than to study war in an environment 
that takes into account that the military profession has special demands: since 
the military profession is distinct from other professions, it requires a distinct 
educational programme. The master’s programme offered by the Norwegian 
Command and Staff College develops the individual officers’ expertise, makes 
him ever more aware of the responsibility that accompanies the profession of 
arms, encourages awareness of self and others with an emphasis on identity, 
and challenges him to rethink and improve his military ethos. The Norwegian 
programme will inevitably undergo changes in the future, and one will be faced 
with what belongs to such a master’s degree and what does not. When in doubt, 
one might well revisit Marshal Ferdinand Foch’s favourite question: De quoi 
s’agit-il? – “what is it all about?” The brief answer in terms of war studies and 
military studies is that it is all about the profession of arms.
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INTRODUCTION
War studies as an academic subject is being developed at the Swedish National 
Defence College (SNDC) as part of the academisation of the officer profession in 
Sweden. It now forms the core subject in the teaching of officers at the college, 
and will soon be the major subject also in the teaching at the lower levels in the 
officer training programme. 
As an academic subject, war studies at our college is only a few years 
old. The academic study of war and warfare is, of course, not new. It has been 
pursued in a variety of academic subjects, most prominently history (where it 
is a speciality called military history) and political science but also in the be-
havioural sciences. The reason for developing war studies at the SNDC is not, 
however, to create an alternative to already existing subjects such as military 
history and strategy. It is to create an academic basis for the officer profession. 
Consequently, our understanding of the nature of this profession and its present 
and future needs forms the most important point of departure for our definition 
of the subject. 
Developing a subject as part of the academisation of a profession, and re-
flecting the needs of that profession, may be seen as putting the cart before the 
horse. Should not academic professions be an offshoot of an academic subject? 
Starting with the subject may well be the ideal case from a standard basic 
science – applied science perspective. In actual fact, however, academisation and 
developing a research basis for the profession seems, historically, to have come 
after the establishment of the professions as often as not. Indeed, even for our 
oldest and most respectable professions, such as medicine, engineering and law, 
the professions existed (in a manner of speaking) before a scientific basis was 
developed for them. We are now seeing that process being repeated in a number 
of professions in, for example, health care and law enforcement, to mention two 
recent cases in Sweden. This is, of course, being undertaken in a more systematic 
and controlled fashion than was the case when universities were created in early 
medieval times to serve as professional schools.1 
1 The research university as we know it today is quite recent and dates back only to 
Humboldt’s reforms of the Prussian system in the nineteenth century.
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Training and education for the professions now being academised star-
ted with professional schools where the curriculum comprised some academic 
subjects, as well as more profession oriented practical training. This approach 
characterised the officer profession as well, where the training and education of 
an officer involved many academic subjects: history, mathematics, and a variety 
of engineering subjects, as well as more practical training in the profession. The 
reason for including these academic subjects was not to make academics of the 
officer candidates but to teach them things that would presumably make them 
better officers.
Why change this? Why academise by creating new subjects that reflect the 
needs of the profession? A major reason in our case has been the need to effect 
change. In the pre-academic stage, a major source of teaching was the personal 
experience of the teachers, who were serving officers. When professional trai-
ning is based only on experience, the professions tend to be conservative: Basing 
teaching on personal experience is, after all, looking backwards. This works 
well in times of continuity, but it will not serve us well when times change. And 
ours are times of change.
A SUBJECT BASED CURRICULUM
At the SNDC, we decided, as part of the academisation process, to leave the old, 
course based curriculum for a subject based one where the central subject was 
to be that of war studies. The reason for creating a new subject, and for moving 
to a subject based curriculum generally, was the need for a vehicle for systematic 
and cumulative growth of knowledge. In a course oriented curriculum, this is 
hard, or impossible, for there is no “natural home” for cumulative growth of 
knowledge, so to speak. In such a curriculum, knowledge rests with the course 
directors, and there is no development of what Karl Popper called “World 3” for 
the officer profession, i.e., knowledge independent of those who possess it.2 If 
there is no cumulative growth, there is also no systematic base for developing the 
profession. Our reason for choosing to base our academisation process on sub-
jects, rather than continuing with a course based curriculum, was thus the need 
to create a base for developing the profession by creating vehicles for systematic 
and cumulative growth of knowledge relevant for the training and education of 
officers. War studies was, of course, not the only subject developed to support 
the academisation process. We also started developing a new understanding of 
the subject of military technology as a subject focussing not only on technology 
as such, but on the relations between technology, tactics and operations, as well 
as the subject of command and control science as part of this process. I will have 
more to say about the latter later in this paper.
2 Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973).
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WAR STUDIES
In 2005, we decided on the following description of the subject of war studies, 
after some five years of discussion at the college: 
War studies is the study of war, warfare and conflict management where military 
resources are created and used in operations in peacetime, encompassing the en-
tire spectrum of conflict and at all levels of warfare … the subject can … be said 
to encompass two perspectives, i.e. knowledge about war and warfare (theory) 
and ability in war and warfare (practice) … Research must … relate to the three 
levels of warfare, that of military strategy, that of operations, and that of tactics, 
and the three corresponding levels of command and control. 3
Note that the central terms “war” and “warfare”, that constitute the object of 
study, are not defined. This is how it has to be, and it is standard practice in 
descriptions of academic subjects. A formal and technical definition of the area 
of study would necessarily involve theory, and theory will change as research 
progresses; definitions are not the starting point of research, they are the result 
of research. For example, to base the definition of war on the Clausewitzian 
understanding of the subject would probably not serve us very well any more; 
we simply do not seem to have Clausewitzian wars any more, so this definition 
would quickly render our whole enterprise “academic” in the worst sense of 
that term: The “utility of force” in international relations is no longer what it 
used to be.4 The same holds for the term “warfare” as well as that of “warfigh-
ting”. Warfare is in a continuous flux as a consequence of new technology, and 
cannot be given a general definition. This is because war and warfare are social 
processes dependent on history. It creates special problems when developing a 
research base for the subject of war studies. I will return to this problem below.
WAR STUDIES AS THE BASIS OF THE OFFICER’S PROFESSION
Our subject of war studies is, as already mentioned, developed to serve as a 
basis for the officer profession. As a consequence, we started our development 
of the subject by drawing a line of demarcation between those aspects of war 
and warfare that are the province of the politicians and that which is the proper 
province of the military. We then asked what it is that officers are actually asked 
to do by their political masters. This led to a tripartite division of the content of 
the subject into military strategy, military operations and military theory. These 
are not terms of the same kind: military strategy and military operations re-
fer to activities, while military theory encompasses distilled military knowledge 
3 Ämnesplaner vid Försvarshögskolan, vol. 1, p. 6 (my translation).
4 See, for example, Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern 
World (London: Allen Lane, 2005).
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that presumably serves as a basis for understanding both military strategy and 
military operations, as well as more fundamental questions such as “What is 
war?”,5 “How are wars won or lost?”, and the like.6 All these three aspects of 
the subject can be studied like any academic subject, and do not require military 
competence.
However, the officer is a practitioner, not a philosopher. He or she is not 
employed by the state to think about war, but to practice it (or, at least, have the 
capability to do so), and the training and education of officers must reflect this. 
To acknowledge this, we made a distinction between two perspectives: know-
ledge about war and ability in war. This is, perhaps, the most innovative aspect 
of our development of the subject, and it reflects our commitment to developing 
a subject that can actually serve as an academic basis for the training and edu-
cation of professional officers, and it signals our understanding that our task is 
not only to produce academics who can think and write about war, but also, and 
perhaps more important, practitioners who are able to actually practice warfare. 
That is, the subject of war studies should actually serve as a basis for the training 
and education of warfighters. 
THE TWO BASES FOR ACADEMIC TEACHING: RESEARCH AND PROVEN ExPERIENCE
According to Swedish law, academic teaching should be based on research and 
proven experience. Before we proceed, we need to pause to sort out these two 
concepts.
research as a basis for teaching
What it means to base teaching on research is reasonably well understood, even 
though the creation of small colleges without a research base of its own has 
led to various attempts to dilute the meaning of the concept of research based 
teaching. The idea is simple enough, at least in theory. The point of departure 
is the academic view of knowledge, i.e., that it is provisional, a hypothesis at 
best. Its value lies in its justification, i.e., in the methods used to produce it. 
The academic approach is based on the postulate that teaching should involve 
both what is claimed to be the case (the hypothesis) and the justification for this 
claim (the method), and the insight that the only possible way to understand the 
method is to practice it, that is, to use it both to evaluate what is being claimed 
5 It may seem somewhat worrisome to have the very subject of an academic discipline 
as a research problem in that same discipline. However, if we take the question “What 
is war?” not to concern the essence of war, but its empirical form, the question is of 
course a legitimate subject of research. The other questions in military theory must be 
understood in the same way, if military theory is to serve any purpose in the teaching 
and training of officers.
6 Military theory is not theory in the ordinary sense of empirically tested propositions, 
but is probably better seen as interpretation to aid understanding. Its function as a 
guide to practice is therefore problematic. This is discussed further later on in the 
paper.
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to be the case and to produce new knowledge. This requires teachers who know 
both these aspects. According to time honoured academic tradition, this is pos-
sible only if the teachers also do research in the subjects that they teach. It also 
requires teaching methods that require and enable the students to practice using 
the methods in discussions and to produce new knowledge. Hence, in a very 
real sense, academic teaching aims at developing researchers, or at least students 
who have a researcher’s mindset. Teaching that does not produce students who 
have adopted the academic view of knowledge and who are not able to evaluate 
knowledge claims and to find new knowledge within their chosen subject must 
be deemed a failure, and worth neither the effort nor the cost. But if the teaching 
succeeds, the possibility for change and growth has been created, although there 
is some risk involved here, for we can never know exactly what changes we are 
going to see.
Teaching based on proven experience
“Proven experience” is a less clear concept than research. Although it is part of 
Swedish law and forms the basis of a variety of professions, it is hard to find a 
generally accepted definition of it. 
Looking at how the concept is used in, for example, the teaching and 
practice of medicine, one might say that proven experience is the knowledge 
that underlies professional decisions and professional practice. It should not be 
confused with experience. Just having “been there and done that” does not yield 
proven experience. Experience in this sense may do in traditional professional 
education, but as the profession strives to become “academic” the emphasis is 
shifted from stressing experience as such to emphasizing “proven experience”. 
Thus, when a doctor chooses a treatment for a disease, this decision should 
be based on proven experience. If it cannot be shown to be based on proven 
experience, the doctor is subject to legal action. 
To base a decision on proven practice means to base it on the best available 
knowledge about the problem at hand. For it to be proven experience, it must 
be formulated experience (it cannot be tacit, even though tacit knowledge is im-
portant in most professions, and has to be acquired by experience), and it must 
have been explicitly evaluated in, for example, a consensus conference, or some 
other way. The evaluation should be public, so that everyone can partake of it. 
All relevant knowledge is part of the proven experience, relevant research re-
sults as well. There is no contradiction between proven experience and research; 
research is a subset of the proven experience, and generally the most important 
part. 
In a profession, every practitioner is required to know what constitutes 
proven experience for the decisions that he or she has to make in his or her pro-
fession. The field of the profession is defined by that for which there is proven 
experience. Only those decisions and practices for which there is some form of 
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proven experience are allowed in the profession. Finding these decisions and 
practices is not always easy, for what is proven experience may actually be de-
cided only after a mistake has been made, and determining and formulating 
it may be part of the legal proceedings against the professional who made the 
mistake.
It is important to understand that relying on proven experience as a basis 
for teaching is not different in principle from using research as a basis. It simply 
requires that what is being taught should be based on the best knowledge availa-
ble, including relevant research findings, and spelling out what that basis is. Just 
like the teaching of those aspects that are based on research, the teaching based 
on proven practice involves imparting an academic attitude to what is agreed to 
be proven experience, that is, the teachers and practitioners are required to con-
tinuously scrutinize and update it as new results and new experience becomes 
available. What is proven practice changes over time, just like research does.
research and proven experience in the teaching and training of officers
Applied to war studies, what constitutes the research base for teaching know-
ledge about war is not problematic, for this is part of the already existing sub-
jects such as history or political science. However, these subjects do not define 
all that is needed for teaching war studies as defined above. For the other aspect, 
ability in war, which is the aspect that concerns the teaching and training aimed 
at developing professional competence, proven practice constitutes the most im-
portant part. In view of the fact that officer education is aimed at educating 
and training professionals, finding the proven practice and the relevant research 
basis for the professional practice is clearly the most important part of finding 
a research basis for the teaching of war studies in the education and training of 
officers. 
Basing the education and training for ability in war and warfare on proven 
experience thus requires us not only to decide which aspects of current profes-
sional practice have passed the requisite tests and can be included in the corpus 
of proven practice, but also to find whatever research results that are relevant. 
Moreover, it requires us to systematically develop the proven experience for the 
profession. 
The question then, is whether proven experience for the military profession 
exists, and where do we find it? The closest we can come to this is doctrine and 
regulations, such the Swedish Army Regulations 2. They are based on formu-
lated experience, and they have usually been thoroughly discussed in the Armed 
Forces. Some aspects are even based on research, or at least testing of various 
kinds, and experimentation as that concept is now understood. However, as 
examples of proven experience, these kinds of publications are not always sat-
isfactory, for they do not offer the complete basis for the rules and advice that 
they provide. This sometimes makes them hard to understand and to evaluate. 
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In this connection, it is interesting to note that as we started to teach military 
theory in a more systematic way at the college the students said that, for the first 
time, they now understood the basis of many rules and regulations that they had 
earlier just had to memorize. 
The question now is how we can produce a firmer base in research for the 
professional practice of officers. This question was not addressed in the work 
leading to the description of the subject of war studies given above. That work 
was limited to discussing the research base for the aspect knowledge about war. 
This seems to have led some to believe that basing the teaching and training of 
officers in history and political science was all that was required for the acade-
misation of the officer profession, forgetting the need to anchor teaching and 
training in proven experience as well.
THE RESEARCH BASE FOR ABILITy IN WAR AND WARFARE
To answer the question of where we are to find the research base for teaching 
ability in war, we must start by asking another question: What is the officer’s 
core competence, that which sets the officer profession apart from other profes-
sions? Or, to put it simply, what is it that officers do as professionals? 
To answer this, we must seek the answer to the question of why we have 
defence forces and what the officer’s role in these forces is. Swedish politicians 
have been clear enough on this point: The task of the Swedish Armed Forces is 
to have the capability for armed combat. The officer’s role is to lead this acti-
vity, so we may therefore say that the officer’s core competence is to lead armed 
combat. This, then, is what we are educating and training officers to do. To find 
the research that can serve as the basis for this is to find that which is aimed at 
understanding and improving the officer’s ability to lead armed combat.
What does it mean to lead armed combat? It seems prudent to keep things 
simple here. Modern combat is a very complex activity, and it is easy to get lost 
in detail if we list each and every thing an officers needs to know. Instead, we 
take a bird’s eye view. 
What we are interested in here is, of course, not only leading armed com-
bat, but what is required to lead successfully. Our question, then, is: what does 
it take to lead successfully? According to our line of reasoning here, the answer 
to that question would define the officer’s core competence. Sticking to our pro-
mise to keep things simple, we can point to two preconditions that would define 
the officer’s core competence:
To decide what should be done
To actually get it done.
This may seem simplistic, but it serves our purposes in this context. We have 
termed the first aspect command (“ledning” in Swedish) and the second aspect 
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It may seem strange to separate these two aspects of the activity to lead 
since in professional practice they are united in one activity, that of leading. 
However, the technological development has made it mandatory to distinguish 
between them, for we are now employing more and more technology that affects 
the one aspect, but not the other. For example, the whole network centric war-
fare/network enabled capability/network based defence – whatever one wants 
to call it – is about improving command, but it does not do much to support 
leadership, as defined here.
Leadership is traditionally part of the training and education of officers, 
and it is a subject of its own at the SNDC with its own research practices and 
theories. I will leave that aside for the time being and concentrate on the first 
question.
COMMAND
To exercise command, that is, to find what should be done, the commander 
must know what is possible, and that he is able to understand his mission and 
the situation so that he or she can choose the best course of action among those 
that are possible. Command and control (C2) science as it is being developed 
at the SNDC is concerned with understanding this process and finding ways to 
improve it.7 Our research has produced a general model of C2, and this model 
defines the basic functions that need to be accomplished for successful C2. Ac-
cording to the model, there are three such functions. We call them sensemaking, 
planning and data collection. Sensemaking is defined as the function that pro-
duces an understanding of the mission and the situation in terms of what must 
be done. The planning function takes the output of the sensemaking function 
and transforms it into a conception of how that which must be done is to be ac-
complished in detail (“the plan”). The plan is then transformed into orders (the 
principal product of the C2 system). The data collection function collects the 
data required by the sensemaking function. The design of C2 support is create 
the form (organisation, methods, processes, procedures and support systems) 
that helps accomplish the function, and the education and training of officers to 
lead armed combat is enabling them to accomplish the functions by means of the 
C2 system. This is not the place to discuss our C2 model in detail. For that, the 
reader is referred to Brehmer only to show that it is possible to describe what is 
required for successful command, and thus also for the aspect of leading armed 
combat.8 Thus, our model specifies that the officers should be trained to “make 
7 For a description of command and control science, see the chapter on 
“Ledningsvetenskap” [Command and Control Science] in Ämnesplaner för 
Försvarshögskolan (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2005).
8 Berndt Brehmer (ed.), Krigsvetenskaplig årsbok 2005 (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 
2006) and Berndt Brehmer, One Loop to Rule Them All, proceedings of the 11th 
International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 
Cambridge, 26–29 September, 2006. [CCRP (online 22 Feb 2007)]
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sense” of the mission and the situation (individually or as staff members) so that 
they can come up with a course of action, to develop this course of action into 
orders and to know what data they need and how to get them. This is not part 
of military theory or leadership studies.9 However, the three subjects together: 
military theory (pointing to what the possibilities are), command and control 
science (by developing methods and systems that help choosing among the pos-
sibilities to achieve the mission under the circumstances at hand), and leadership 
studies (developing methods to get things done) here produce the research basis 
for the officer’s core competence: to lead armed combat. Thus, the officer’s core 
competence can be based on research.
TENSIONS IN THE ACADEMISATION OF THE OFFICER’S PROFESSION
Developing an academic basis for the officer profession leads to some tensions, 
and I shall end the paper by discussing some of them. The first of these has to do 
with the needs of the present in relation to the need to produce scientific know-
ledge, the second with the need for normative knowledge, and the third with 
relation between the scope of war studies, and research generally, in relation to 
the needs of the profession, as the profession might see them.
Teaching for present needs vs. the need for academically respectable research
There is an essential difference between war studies and the classical examples 
of academic professions, such as medicine and engineering. Thus, the object of 
medicine and engineering are physiological and physical phenomena, respecti-
vely, neither of which is subject to historical change. Research can therefore be 
seen as a process of increasing the scientific basis for the profession in a relati-
vely uncomplicated manner. The object of war studies, war and warfare, on the 
other hand, is a social phenomenon, which is subject to historical change. While, 
for example, doctors have been able to take it for granted that the nature of the 
body remains constant, officers (and politicians for that matter) cannot take it 
for granted that war is war. Indeed, current military failures can be understood 
as the result of a failure to understand that the nature of war has changed not 
only when it comes to the “utility of force” to use Rupert Smith’s expression, 
but with respect to where and how wars will have to be fought (for example, 
Alice Hills) as well. 10 The answer to the question “What is war?” seems to 
have a new answer depending on when and where it is asked.11 This is a source 
of frustration when one tries to use scientific methods to develop a cumulative 
9 This is, of course, not all the research that is needed. We also need research that 
perfects the means that the commander has at his or her disposal, such as weapons, 
logistics, transport, and so on.
10 See, for example Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Smith, 
The Utility of Force... and Alice Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal 
Dilemma (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
11 See John A. Lynn, Battle. A History of Combat and Culture (Westview Press, 2003).
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body of knowledge, for the standard methods of science may not apply, and it 
may not be possible to obtain the data that are needed.
Research in military theory, which is currently the best developed aspect of 
war studies, serves as a good example. As described by Nils Marius Rekkedal,12 
military theory can be studied, either historically, or aimed at understanding 
today’s wars and warfare. A historical approach would investigate what theories 
have been proposed, the influences, their effects and so on. This makes the study 
of military theory a part of the history of ideas. An impressive example of this 
approach is Azar Gat’s History of Military Thought.13 Interesting as this is, its 
relation to current military practice is not clear, and it raises all the problems 
pertaining to the role of military history in particular, and the use of history in 
general, in preparing officer candidates for the profession.14 
An alternative approach is, if I read Rekkedal correctly,15 to see work in 
military theory as aimed at understanding today’s wars. This makes military 
theory a part of social sciences, and as such, it is concerned with understanding 
and interpretation to derive a basis for action.16 In the attempts at understanding 
and interpretation, all possible sources would be used in combination with the 
standard machinery of critiquing and evaluating these sources, but it would, of 
course, never be able to live up to ordinary requirements for completeness of 
sources as demanded in research in, for example, history. That evidence will not 
be available until some time in the future, when it may be too late, and if we wait-
ed for that evidence, we would be doomed to live through yet another example 
of fighting the last war over again. What the military theorist does is more like 
qualified journalism than research in the classical sense. In his work, he would 
probably not be able to rely on established theory, even though research in mili-
tary theory may well take the form of comparing recent events with classical mi-
litary theories, such as is being done in the seemingly never ending resurrections 
of Clausewitz,17 just to refute him or claim that he is no longer relevant.18
The second of these approaches is clearly distinct from military theory as 
an aspect of the study of the history of ideas. It makes military theory a histo-
rical fact, not only in the sense that all theories are historical facts, but also be-
cause what is studied is war in a given time and place, not war in general, for the 
12 Nils Marius Rekkedal, “Nya utmaningar för militärteorin” in Berndt Brehmer (ed.), 
Krigsvetenskaplig årsbok 2005 (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2006).
13 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
14 See Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge & Paul Kegan, 
1957) for a general discussion of what can be learned from history.
15 Rekkedal, “Nya utmaningar för militärteorin”.
16 Smith, The Utility of Force…would be an example.
17 See, for example, Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
18 When looking at the role of Clausewitz in military theory, one cannot help being 
reminded of the role of Freud in psychology. Perhaps military theorists would have 
something to learn from the debate over Freud and his theories in psychology.
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changes in war and warfare preclude this. Useful though it may be, it is certainly 
not science as we normally understand it.
The same goes for warfare and war fighting. How wars are fought (however 
the concept of war is understood) is dependent on culture and technology,19 and 
it has always been difficult for military theory both to keep up with technolo-
gical developments (the failure to understand the consequences of the machine 
gun suffices as an example) and to find an understanding of war and war fight-
ing that is not specific to a given culture. While this is not an obstacle to doing 
research it seems to create an insurmountable obstacle to developing a research 
based foundation for preparing the officer for today’s problems. 
There seems to be no easy way to resolve this tension between the two 
approaches. Those who adhere to traditional scientific ideals, will always be 
impatient with the more journalistic approach of those who try to understand 
the present, and those who study the present will find little use for the more his-
torically oriented approach to military theory. This, then, seems to be a tension 
that we will have to live with. 
The normative/descriptive tension
For a subject to have a place in a professionally oriented curriculum, it must con-
tribute to better practice, i.e., it must contribute to the fount of proven practice. 
This means that it must have clear and well understood normative implications, 
i.e., it must prescribe certain forms of action and prohibit others, or at least give 
some form of advice to the practitioner facing a problem. 
The normative status of war studies in general, and military theory in parti-
cular, is problematic,20 for although military theory may have an empirical basis 
in that it is derived and distilled from experience, it is generally not tested, and, 
more important, its range of application, that is, the conditions under which the 
theory applies, are not known. It is thus very different from the theories that 
form the basis for the medical and engineering professions. Hence, the “recipes” 
for action that come from military theory have an uncertain status as guides to 
action. This is true both for what military theory teaches about war, and for 
what it has to say about warfare and warfighting. For example, the ten or so 
“principles of war” are in need of reinterpretation in the information age.21
Perhaps the advice and principles that come out of military theory, just 
like the results of military history, should be understood as pointing to possi-
bilities rather than advice to be followed. A choice among the possibilities can 
19 Lynn, Battle…
20 Jerker Widén and Jan Ångström: “Ska militärteori förstås som teori eller praktik?” in 
Berndt Brehmer (ed.), Krigsvetenskaplig årsbok 2005 (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 
2006).
21 See Anthony D. Mac Ivor, Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2005) and Robert Leonhard, The Principles of War in the Information 
Age (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999) for interesting discussions of this problem.
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be made only in the command and control process as the mission and situation 
are analyzed, and possible courses of action are evaluated. If so, the principles 
from military theory and military history would prove very useful even though 
they do not have the status of normative theory, viz., that of widening the set of 
possible courses of action to solve a given military problem. It seems to me that 
this is what is meant by “art of war” or “operational art” i.e., the use of military 
theory in practice. 
The subject in relation to the profession
The third tension is that between the scope of the subject and that of the profes-
sion. As we are developing the subject of war studies to serve as the basis of the 
academisation of the profession, one might expect that the subject would actu-
ally cover the same field as the profession, and cover the whole field as well. As 
the discussion above shows, we have not succeeded in this. This is particularly 
true with respect to the second perspective: that of providing a research basis for 
the ability in war. Even if this perspective is limited to the officer’s core compe-
tence of leading armed combat, the subject of war studies is only one of at least 
three subjects required. The other subjects are command and control science 
and leadership studies. Therefore, we cannot achieve a credible academic base 
for the officer profession by putting all our money on war studies. This should 
not be a problem when it is clearly understood that a number of subjects are 
necessary to provide an academic basis for the officer profession as a whole, as 
has always been the case.
But just as the profession covers more territory than war studies does, the 
subject of war studies will also have to be allowed to cover more, and perhaps 
also different territory, than the profession currently does. This is imperative if 
the subject is to serve as a basis for reform and development of the profession. 
Such reform and development can only spring from research that points to new 
possibilities outside of the range of current practice. It is necessary, therefore, 
to be patient, and allow researchers in war studies to work on problems, the 
relevance of which cannot be seen immediately. This is well understood in the 
professions that have a longer history of being academically based than the of-
ficer profession currently enjoys, although that patience may be limited also in 
these professions. Medicine provides examples. To resolve this tension should be 
a matter of time, even though it will eventually probably disappear completely.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper started as an essay on war studies but ended up as a discussion of 
the research basis for the officer profession. A central theme to emerge from 
this is the need to find a research basis, not only for the aspect that we have cal-
led knowledge about war, but also for the aspect that we have called ability in 
war. Another central theme to emerge is the seminal role of proven experience, 
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and the consequent need to assess that proven experience to serve as a basis for 
the teaching and training of officers. Work towards this end has started at the 
SNDC, so I am optimistic about the future here, and more so since research is 
now producing a better base for the ability in war and warfare as well. Our re-
search group in command and control science at the SNDC has provided a new 
and better method for planning at the tactical level that is now being implemen-
ted in the Swedish Armed Forces, to give just one example. 
However, it is clear that academisation of the officer profession also in-
volves tensions that are hard to resolve. One is that between the need to under-
stand the present in changing times vs. the need to have results that have been 
produced by the ordinary research process, another is the issue of the normative 
status of the results produced by work in military theory and war science gene-
rally when our object of study changes with the times. These are tensions with 
which we will simply have to live, and it will in all likelihood be easier to live 
with them if they are on the table than swept under the carpet.

ADVANCED EDUCATION OF OFFICERS IN THE 21ST CENTURy: 
WAR STUDIES OR THE SCIENCE OF WAR AS THE CORE ELEMENT
Major General Karsten Møller 
Commandant of the Royal Danish Defence College
NEW BASIC CONDITIONS FOR THE PROFESSION
The theoretical aspect of modern advanced officer education has received much 
emphasis in recent years. There is – even in Denmark – increasing awareness of 
the need to know more about the philosophical basis for the officer’s profession. 
What is the nature of war or armed conflict? This is an extremely relevant ques-
tion, because since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts between states have 
become an exception rather than the rule.
Armed conflicts within states, however, occur increasingly often, together 
with several other types of conflicts, such as the world community’s policing role 
in connection with violations of human rights, nation building in failed states 
etc. These types of conflicts create significant challenges for the military profes-
sion as a whole. Unpredictability and complexity are central concepts in modern 
warfare. The soldier’s role can shift from “emergency aid worker in uniform” 
to warrior in a split second. The conditions for the use of military force have 
changed. Media coverage of armed conflicts is intense. A tendency exists among 
politicians and the public to believe that military force can be wielded with sur-
gical precision, with very few military losses and no or only minimal loss of ci-
vilian lives. This is undoubtedly a worthy objective but it is inconsistent with the 
nature of war, which basically involves forcing one side’s will on the other side, 
and where the weakest side often systematically uses the civilian population as 
a shield. The social framework for armed conflicts has changed considerably 
since the end of the Cold War, which means that military force should be used 
as an instrument only after serious consideration and with caution at both the 
political and military levels. Therefore, knowledge of the military profession’s 
basic conditions is an extremely central aspect of modern officer education on a 
par with the more practical skills.1
1 See Janne Haaland Matlary, “Den internasjonaliserte militærmakten: hva kreves 
av offiseren?” [International military power: What is required of the officer?] in 
Festschrift on the occasion of the 175th anniversary of the Royal Danish Defence 
College (Royal Danish Defence College, 2005), pp. 80–98; Janne Haaland Matlary 
and Øyvind Østerud (ed.), Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar? [Toward denationalized 
armed forces?] (Oslo: Abstrakt, 2005) and Janne Haaland Matlary, Values and 
Weapons. From Humanitarian Intervention to Regime Change? (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006).
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research-based
The tendency described above is one of the reasons for the academisation of 
officer education that is developing in most of the Western world. But equally 
important is the wish to make officer education comparable to the civilian aca-
demic educational system, in order to improve recruiting and create alternative 
career opportunities for those who are no longer needed in the military system. 
Academisation demands a research-based education programme.2 
Research in study areas that are unique to officer education and are not 
offered at universities will be conducted by the Royal Danish Defence College. 
They include such subjects as strategy and military operations, security policy, 
and military leadership. Research conducted by other academic institutions will 
be incorporated in the following areas: military psychology; pedagogy and or-
ganisation; management and digital administration; military technology; and 
foreign languages and cultural competence.3
Science or art of war?
The central question concerning the research base for the core competencies 
leads naturally to the interesting discussion about to what extent a special sci-
ence of war exists in line with other scientific disciplines. Or is it really the art of 
war we are discussing? In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, there has been a reluctance 
to speak of a science of war and, instead, the less pretentious but very elegant 
term War Studies has been used. The Soviet Union developed a very logical and 
consistent theory of war founded on Marxism-Leninism and considered it scien-
tific in nature. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Marxism-Leninism, the 
Soviet version of the science of war is no longer of interest.
Theoretical scientific thinking within military science
Denmark has no tradition for cultivating the philosophic and scientific theoreti-
cal thinking that is the basis for military science. Even though the Danish Society 
of Military Science has existed since 1871, it is primarily concerned with the art 
of war. Until now, the service academies (officer schools) and the Royal Danish 
Defence College have only to a limited extent studied the theory of war as part 
of military science. But there have been exceptions such as the late Colonel Nils 
Berg and Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Nielsen. Colonel Berg is especially known 
for his excellent translation into Danish of Vom Kriege and his contribution to 
the development of modern officer education through the introduction of the 
2 See evaluation report from Denmark’s Evaluation Institute, Forsvarets 
linjeofficersuddannelser [Professional officer education in the Armed forces](2003).
3 See Karsten Møller, “Forsvarsakademiet 2001–2005” [Royal Danish Defence College], 
pp. 24–39 and “Forsvarsakademiet efter 2005”, pp. 144–154 in Festschrift…
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model for the basic study of military science.4 More recently, Brigadier General 
Michael Clemmesen has made a significant contribution to War Studies in the 
best Anglo-Saxon tradition through a series of papers and articles and not least 
through his work as commandant of the Baltic Defence College. In recent years, 
his work at the Swedish National Defence College in Stockholm to define mili-
tary science in relation to the academisation process has received considerable 
attention and been a great inspiration, also to the author of this article.
Scientific paradigm shift
People everywhere agree that no art or science is more difficult than war. … This 
art, like all others, is based on certain fixed principles, which according to their 
nature are unchangeable. Only their application can vary: But in themselves they 
are constant. 
This quotation is from a book written in 1766, “History of the Late War in 
Germany”, by Henry Evans Lloyd and illustrates perfectly our dilemma.5 Is 
warfare an art, understood in the sense of experience and knowledge made ef-
fective through cleverness and inspiration, or is it a science, based on laws and 
principles? There can be no doubt that Thucydides, Xenophon, Tacitus and all 
who wrote about war before the modern era, including Machiavelli, considered 
warfare an art. With the birth of modern science and the work of philosopher 
and epistemologist René Descartes and natural scientist Isaac Newton (1642–
1727), among others, and within the social sciences, economist Adam Smith 
(1723–1790), social researcher Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), and historian Da-
vid Hume (1711–1776), all of the “Scotch School”, came a scientific paradigm 
shift that also influenced the development of the art or science of war.
Newton’s Principia became the model for good science, also within the 
science of war. Antoine Henri Jomini (1779–1869) attempted through analyses 
of Frederik the Great’s and the young Napoleon Bonaparte’s campaigns to de-
duce “Newtonian principles” for warfare. His ambition was to create rationality 
in an irrational environment through the theory of warfare expressed in Precis 
de l’Art de Guerre, a textbook characterised by clear and logical methodology 
and terminology, which had significant influence on the scientific thinking on the 
subject of warfare well into the 20th century.
4 Carl von Clausewitz, Om krig [On war], translated and edited by Nils Berg 
(Copenhagen: Rhodos, 1986) and Nils Berg, Landkadetakademiet og Hærens 
Officersskole 1713–1988 [The Land Forces Cadet Academy and the Military 
Academy] (Hærens Officersskole, 1988).
5 Quotation from K.V. Nielsen, “Krigens principper. En historisk oversight” [The 
Principles of War. An Historic Overview], Militært tidsskrift, vol. 98, May (1969): 
204.
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Carl von Clausewitz
Jomini’s contemporary, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), was primarily inte-
rested in the nature of war and its role as a social phenomenon. One could say 
that Clausewitz consciously chose not to involve himself in developing a system, 
whereas Jomini developed a fixed system for warfare with a clear and logical 
context. Clausewitz tried to create a scientific connection between theory and 
reality in the form of war experiences. In my opinion, he has held such a domi-
nant place in the field of military science, because no one else has investigated 
war as a social phenomenon to the extent he has; therefore, he is still relevant 
and uniquely inspiring for military thinkers – and civilian thinkers as well, of 
course. Clausewitz’s scientific ideal is strongly influenced by Immanuel Kant 
(1724–1804), who claims that the social sciences should also follow Newtonian 
principles.6 Clausewitz recognizes, however, that it is hardly possible to apply 
this scientific ideal completely to warfare: 
The concept of law in relation to knowledge can justifiably be dispensed with in 
relation to warfare, because war’s complicated phenomena are not that regular, 
and the regularity is not so complicated as to be able to achieve much more with 
this concept than with the simple truth.7 
His main work, Vom Kriege, can well be considered to comprise the only com-
prehensive and consistent theory of war to date.
J.f.C. fuller
In his book published in 1925, The Foundations of the Science of War, J.F.C. 
Fuller also presents a positivistic view of science. Through studies of Napoleon’s 
campaigns, he had earlier deduced some principles for warfare that he believed 
were verified by World War I, and in this book, he attempts to verify these prin-
ciples in another way, through a philosophical analysis of the human being and 
its characteristics in general and by formulating a law that he calls “The Law of 
Conservation of Military Energy”. Fuller’s “scientific” work is not described or 
commented further here but is just mentioned to provide an example of an im-
possible project: to establish a theory of war that is based only on a positivistic 
scientific ideal. It is and remains a Procrustes’ bed.8
6 See Johannes Witt-Hansen, “Clausewitz – videnskabsteoretisk set” [Clausewitz – in a 
scientific-theoretical perspective], in Clausewitz, Om krig, vol. III, pp. 877–85.
7 Clausewitz, Om krig, vol. I, ch. 4, “Om metoder” [On methods], p. 135.
8 J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundation of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson & Co. 
1925).
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Definition of the science of war
We have now reached the main point of this article, which is by no means epoch-
making: to define what is meant by the science of war. It is a social science; it is 
inter-disciplinary; and uniquely synthetic. As a consequence, it is extremely dif-
ficult to define and delimit this field of endeavor, and disagreement exists among 
those who study it. In addition, no commonly recognized conceptual universe 
or methodology exists. Clarification of these questions requires comprehensive 
analytical work using a theoretical scientific perspective. 
Basic curriculum in military science
Difficulties in defining military science, or rather the scope of the field of military 
science, are well illustrated in the model for a basic curriculum in military scien-
ce, which was developed as mentioned above by Colonel Nils Berg in the mid-
1960s in connection with a thorough revision of the officer training programme 
existing at that time. Nils Berg posed the question: What is the officer’s main 
function? Answering this question led to the identification of what he called the 
core disciplines: operations and management. But since the officer serves the 
state unconditionally in relation to the use of force, deep insight into this aspect 
of his role is necessary. Therefore, political science, including international po-
litics, is part of the core curriculum. In addition, there is the history of warfare, 
which forms the empirical basis for a scientific treatment of war. See figure 1.9
The second question was: What means shall the officer use to carry out his func-
tions? And the answer was that the means provided the officer to carry out his 
functions are human beings and materiel.
9 Berg, Landkadetakademiet…, p. 95.
Figure 1: Core curriculum.
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This led to the addition of two key subject areas to the core curriculum: 
Human sciences (comprising basic knowledge of physiology, psychology and pe-
dagogy) and natural sciences (comprising biology, mathematics, physics, chem-
istry etc.). See figure 2. 10
The third question Berg posed was: Which skills must an officer master – to a 
greater or lesser degree – in order to carry out his main functions? The answer 
was: physical skills, foreign language skills, and several manual skills. The an-
swers to these three questions form the model for the basic curriculum in mili-
tary science. See figure 3.11
10 Ibid., p. 96.
11 Ibid., p. 98.
Figure 2: Core curriculum with key subjectareas.
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The co-evolutionary cycle of warfare
The broad area of study can also be illustrated by another model developed 
in the mid-1960s by Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Nielsen and called the co-
evolutionary cycle of warfare. This cycle consists of three main components: 
Doctrine, technology and organisation. Under ideal circumstances these three 
components are in balance, but developments, typically in technology, bring 
the system out of balance until the two other components can be adjusted. In 
addition, there are developments in the outer environment, society’s ideology, 
Figure 3: Basic curriculum in military science.
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political structures and economy. Often, changes in the outer environment bring 
the cycle out of balance. This illustrates the familiar truth that the societal frame-
work plays an important if not crucial role in developing the armed forces and 
their capabilities, and thus in the conduct of warfare. See figure 4.12 
It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the area of study should be narrower if 
studying the science of war is to have any meaning. 
Identifying the concept of military science
What would it mean if we were to limit ourselves to the concept of the art 
of war, which is not clearly defined either? Or perhaps it would be easier to 
just talk about War Studies? But we must not just give up when confronted by 
challenges that seem insurmountable. A Swedish officer, Colonel Johan René, 
12 Mikkel Storm Jensen, “Krigsførelsens kredsløb” [The co-evolutionary Cycle of 
Warfare], pp. 176–201, Militært tidsskrift, vol. 133, April (2004).
Figure 4: The co-evolutionary cycle of warfare.
OSLO FILES ON DefeNCe aND SeCurITy 472/2007 War STuDIeS
has formulated a good definition of the art of war that can also be used as a 
point of departure for approaching an understanding of the concept of military 
science: “The art of war, which may be understood as a unifying concept based 
on military science, is the use of military force to achieve the goals defined by 
the political leadership”.13 The art of war, in this definition, is connected with 
the professional skills necessary to wage war. Colonel René then defines the 
science of war as the summarizing term for the discipline that is concerned with 
war, warfare, the goals, means and methods of war, and the nature of war in the 
broad sense. Military theory, military history and logistics are part of military 
science.14 Every resourceful student attending the advanced courses provided by 
the Royal Danish Defence College may search the Internet and find the defini-
tion in Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia: 
Military science is the study of the technique, psychology, practice and other 
phenomena which constitute war and armed conflict. It strives to be a scientific 
system that if properly employed, will greatly enhance the practitioner’s ability 
to prevail in armed conflict with any adversary. To this end, it is unconcerned 
whether that adversary is an opposing military force, guerrillas or other irregu-
lars, or any adversary who knows of or utilizes military science in response. Mi-
litary science encompasses six major branches as follows: military organization, 
military education and training, military history, military geography, military 
technology and equipment and military strategy and doctrine.15 
This excellent definition also contains elements of the old Soviet concept in the 
form of its six main elements. According to this definition, the aim of military 
science is to provide practitioners of the profession of arms with the laws and 
principles necessary to achieving victory. Such an aim is not completely unpro-
blematic.
a definition of the science of war 
One of the best thought-out and operational definitions of the science of war is to 
be found in the material written by the Defence High School in connection with 
its application for authorization to give accredited examinations: “The science 
of war is learning about how to use military means of force.” It continues: 
The definition comprises all military actions that are carried out in times of 
peace, crisis, and war for the purpose of influencing another party’s will or capa-
13 Johan René, “Införande av huvudämnet krigsvetenskap vid Försvarshögskolan” 
[Introduction of the Course on the Science of War at the Swedish National Defence 
College], Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademins Handlingar och Tidsskrift (2001): 76.
14 Ibid., p. 76.
15 See Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia [online 3 Jan 2007].
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bility. Military actions are thus preparations to threaten to use force and to use 
force. These actions cover the whole spectrum of activities from the planning, 
preparation and execution, to the conclusion of military operations. The science 
of war comprises the research-based and systematized knowledge of warfare and 
also includes aims, means and methods as well as the use of military forces as an 
instrument of security policy. The science of war is based on modern theories of 
warfare, and primarily includes the areas of tactics, operations and strategy. The 
main aim is – as far as possible – under specific, given or deduced conditions to 
foresee changes to the doctrines guiding future warfare.16 
With this definition we have come far, even though it is still open to discussion. 
It implicitly covers the generation of military forces and their use throughout the 
whole conflict spectrum at all levels of warfare, and it is therefore sufficiently 
broad. The definition delimits the term appropriately. Research and knowledge 
within the framework of the definition will be able to and should influence such 
central areas as concept and doctrine development and education of both offi-
cers and civilians working in the field security and defence policy.
Link between theory and practice
The theoretical basis of military science thus gives it the character of a tradi-
tional academic discipline. However, this basis must be closely linked to the 
military profession’s more practically oriented skills if it is to have any meaning. 
Knowledge of the (theoretical) nature of war and the practical skills necessary to 
wage war must interact. Research must therefore be based on scientifically and 
empirically based knowledge. Research can support and in some instances also 
guide and inspire the military practitioner, who in turn contributes with empi-
rical findings in the form of practical experiences, and in this way develops and 
expands the theoretical basis in a hopefully fruitful synthesis. Research must ne-
cessarily operate on three levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical.
The theory of war
The theory of war is the central element of the science of war. It deals with ge-
neral theoretical questions concerning war, warfare and conflicts. It embraces 
all the levels of warfare and includes analyses of the nature of war and war-
fare, analyses of preparation for war and conflict, and considerations about how 
wars and conflicts can be concluded and won. The theory of war thus attempts 
to impart an understanding of war, warfare, and conflict solution with military 
means, and of how the development of doctrine, technology, leadership and 
16 Swedish National Defence College, Ämnesplan för kirgsvetenskap 2005 [Lesson plan 
for the Science of War], p. 2–5.
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organisation, education and military exercises and logistics influence warfare.17 
In addition, there is the influence of security policy and societal factors, as il-
lustrated in figure 4, the co-evolutionary cycle of warfare. According to Colin 
Gray, changes in the outer environment often have a decisive influence on the 
elements at the core of the cycle. Therefore, the science of war must necessarily 
base its research and the education connected with it on results and methods 
from other disciplines.18 As mentioned above, the science of war is characterised 
by a great degree of inter-disciplinarity and synthesis. In summary, the theory 
of war focuses on the effectiveness of military means and their appropriateness 
with regard to achieving political goals.
Ideographic or nomothetic theory?
A very central problem regarding the theory of war is to whether it is a descrip-
tive and explanatory theory or a normative theory. Descriptive and ideographic 
theory explains the elements that determine the outcome of specific battles, cam-
paigns, wars and conflicts. The methods are known from the study of history. 
Normative theory seeks to contribute knowledge of how battles, campaigns, 
wars and conflicts should be conducted in order to achieve the political goal. It 
seeks to classify objects and concepts in order to search for general laws and is 
therefore nomothetic. Empirical data is derived in both cases from military his-
tory, including, of course, the history of warfare, and in addition, from military 
technology and organisation, doctrines and actual warfighting experience. In 
practice, the difference between the two approaches is not as distinct as it might 
seem from this simplified description, but there is a clear difference between 
military theory and military history.19 Military theory primarily seeks to iden-
tify and analyse general military problems and create a scientific framework for 
military thinking.
Methodological approaches
Many methodological problems are connected with the development of military 
theory. It is presumably clear from the above that military history as an aspect 
of military theory is not completely unproblematic, since they comprise two dif-
ferent theoretical and methodological approaches, the nomothetic and the ideo-
graphic. In this connection, there is an interesting interface between historical 
analysis and reduction, just as the hermeneutic approach to research is a central 
17 Niklas Zetterling, “Varför militärteori?” [Why Military Theory?], Kungl. 
Krigsvetenskapsakademins Handlingar og Tidsskrift: 59–65; K.V. Nielsen, “Krigens 
teori og krigens principper” [The Theory of War and the Principles of War], Militært 
tidsskrift, vol. 98, June (1969): 234–246; K.V. Nielsen, “Den klassiske krigsteori” [The 
Classical Theory of War], Militært tidsskrift, vol. 108, October (1980): 374–87.
18 Colin S. Gray, Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The 
Sovereignty of Context (U.S. Army War College, February 2006).
19 Swedish National Defence College, Ämnesplan för krigsvetenskap 2005, pp. 2–5.
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question. There is in addition the question of legitimate knowledge within mi-
litary theory: How do we gain empirical knowledge? Are military history and 
military studies sufficient sources or is practical military experience also a re-
quirement? These questions indicate that the problem areas and questions must 
be investigated from several perspectives, using various empirical and analytical 
methods individually and in combination.20
research paradigms
It can prove fruitful to take our point of departure in E.G. Guba’s paradigm 
definition: “A basal set of values that determine our actions – both daily actions 
and actions connected with disciplinary investigations”, and in his thesis of four 
general research paradigms, which he identified as follows: the positivistic, the 
neo-positivistic, the critical (critical theory), and the constructivist. Each pa-
radigm answers in its own way three basic questions deriving from the basal 
values of Guba’s definition: ontology (what is reality?); epistemology (how do 
we identify reality through investigation?); and methodology (how do we inves-
tigate reality?).
Figure 5 illustrates the assumptions based on  the four paradigms about 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology. All four paradigms are to a grea-
ter or lesser extent applicable to military science, but neo-positivism and con-
structivism are of interest as two possible and essentially different approaches. 
However, since I am more of a practitioner than a theoretician, I will leave this 
interesting subject to professionals who are schooled in scientific theory.21
ONTOLOGY EPISTEMOLOGY METHODOLOGY
Positivism Realistic Objective Experimental 
manipulating
Neo-positivism Limited realistic Modified objective Modified experimental, 
manipulating
Critical theory Limited realistic Subjective Dialogical, 
transforming
Constructivism Relativistic Subjective Complex
20 Zetterling, “Varför militärteori?”: 59–65.
21 Per Darmer and Claus Nygård, Paradigmetænkning (og dens begrænsning) 
[Thinking in Paradigms (and its Limitations)], pp. 23–25 in Samfundsvidenskabelige 
analysemetoder [Social Science Analysis Methods], ed. Claus Nygård (Forlaget 
Samfundslitteratur, 2005).
Figure 5: Paradigms and their assumptions about ontology, epistemology and methodology.
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The methodology of the science of war 
It must be emphasised that some of the methods used in studying the science 
of war will be a core professional competency, although on another level: staff 
procedures, decision-making processes, operational analyses etc. It is of great 
importance to the military profession that the scientific foundation of the var-
ious methods are constantly being developed. The understanding of methods 
to create and apply new knowledge, including the strengths and limitations of 
these methods, is fundamental to the ability to evaluate and utilize the new 
knowledge. Rational methodological criticism is an important part of the re-
search process. The methodology of military science will make it possible to 
produce knowledge about war and warfare that is scientifically substantiated. 
This leads us back to the question of whether the science of war is nomothetic or 
ideographic. A specific war or conflict will be unique but will most often contain 
more general or generalizable aspects. Consequently, the method will contain 
both ideographic and nomothetic aspects. The methodological possibilities are 
almost legion: Both quantitative and qualitative methods can be used as well as 
explanatory and interpretive methods. The methodology used can thus actually 
encompass the whole scale from actual experimentation to hermeneutic-based 
research.
The strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations
An important and complicated aspect of military science is that it has three 
classical, separate levels of operations: the strategic, the operational, and the 
tactical. The Anglo-Saxon tradition also often refers to Grand Strategy, which is 
understood as a nation’s total political and military strategy and has been very 
descriptively called Stratègie Totale by André Beaufre. Classical Soviet military 
science distinguished between the following levels: tactical, tactical-operational, 
operational, operational-strategic, strategic, and strategic-political. In order not 
to further complicate the issue, the following discussion will only deal with the 
three “classical” levels named above.
Military strategy involves to a great extent describing and analysing the 
connection between the highest political decision-making level and the military 
operational leadership. Research in military strategy is primarily concerned with 
the use of military force in support of and as an integral element in the total 
overall national strategy to achieve politically defined  goals. The use of military 
force ranges from the threat to use force and deterrence from the use of violence 
to coercion and actual use of force. 
Military strategic research often attempts to clarify the more general stra-
tegic principles and their implementation in practice. Research also investigates 
the decision-making processes of the highest political-military level, not least 
because the military-political level advises the political level regarding the em-
ployment of military forces and the determination of military tasks and goals. 
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The military strategic level translates and formulates the overall goals into mis-
sions to be accomplished at the operational level.
The military operational level describes and analyses the planning and exe-
cution of operations, and the coordination of the deployment of various military 
assets, including coordination with civilian resources, to the area of the con-
flict.22 Research is primarily aimed at joint operations, i.e. operations conducted 
by two or more services, and what is called operational art in Germany, Russia 
and the Anglo-Saxon nations. Operational art is a very broad term and actually 
embraces all areas in which military means are employed, and it often also forms 
the basis for developing and formulating doctrine. The operational level was 
“conceived” in Prussia, and its primary aim is to bridge the strategic and tacti-
cal levels. The operational level is characterised by larger-scale, complex joint 
operations, whereas the tactical level is characterised by smaller-scale operations 
and battles. Both levels require practical military skills, i.e. practical military 
compentencies on the part of officers to develop solutions to specific military 
tasks in order to achieve aims defined at higher levels of command.
research areas
As implied in the presentation of the co-evolutionary cycle of warfare, techno-
logical and military-technical developments are an essential strategic parameter. 
Therefore, new technology primarily information technology, and, in the near 
future, nano-technology, are the focus of intensive research. It is interesting that 
the development of these technologies has been driven by the civilian sector, 
whereas the most important technological developments during most of the 
Cold War were primarily driven by military technological requirements.
The basic research connected with the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) and the discussion it has sparked, is interesting, since for the most part 
it concerns the application of civilian technologies to military concepts, such as 
Network Centric Warfare, Effects-Based Operations and Rapid Decisive Opera-
tions, or whatever is in vogue just now. (They all seem to refer to the same basic 
concept. This seems to be a characteristic of modern management literature – by 
inventing new names for well-known concepts, one can become the guru of the 
month, and even make money on it, a lot of money).
Research is still going on – fortunately – in the field of conventional war-
fare in the broad meaning of the term. The problems of manoeuvre theory and 
manoeuvre war are still relevant, as are the new forms of warfare: low-inten-
sity conflicts, asymmetric warfare, terrorism and counter-insurgency operations 
(COIN), as these types of conflicts have manifested themselves in Bosnia, Ko-
sovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Darfur, Rwanda, Congo, Sierra Leone etc. It 
is clear that research in peacekeeping, peace support, peace-enforcing operations 
22 Swedish National Defence College, Ämnesplan för krigsvetenskap, p. 3 and pp. 6–7.
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and military operations in the grey areas of humanitarian intervention, nation 
building, and civil-military co-operation (CIMIC), which includes cooperation 
with non-governmental organisations, is of increasing importance. 
Finally, the third factor in the co-evolutionary cycle of warfare, leadership 
and organisation, which also includes the human factor, are also the objects of 
extensive and important research. There can be no doubt that military leadership 
will undergo considerable changes as a result of the general social developments 
in society, but also due to the character of modern conflicts, which demand new 
competencies, as described so well by Janne Haaland Matlary and by Katrine 
Nørgaard and Wilhelm Holsting.23
The academisation of the education of Danish officers
Such great emphasis is placed on the development of military science, because 
it is, of course, a vital component in the academisation process in officer educa-
tion. In this connection, it is necessary to choose between two different courses 
of action. 
Already established academic areas such as political science, economics, 
technology, history, psychology and organisational theory can form the basis of 
the academic programme. This would involve purchasing research-based exper-
tise at existing universities. A large share of the teaching would thus be based 
on external research, while teaching in the core military competencies would be 
carried out on the basis of more or less systematic studies that hardly quailify 
as research. This would often be based on a more or less normative tradition. In 
principle, this is the way in which the advanced officer education at the Royal 
Danish Defence College has been conducted for many years, until it was deci-
ded in 2001 in accordance with the Royal Danish Defence College’s vision to 
create a research-based university-level education programme which includes 
the core military competencies and leads to the award of an accredited Master’s 
degree.24
Another possibility would be to let academisation comprise the tradition-
al core military competencies such as strategy, operations etc. with the aim of 
bringing a certain degree of academisation into the officer profession – only a 
certain degree due to the fact that the officer profession is traditionally practi-
cally oriented, and a good officer must have mastered the basic professional 
skills. But in the complicated modern conflict environment an officer must have 
additional competencies. In addition to being a warrior and a military leader, he 
23 See note 1 and Katrine Nørgård and Wilhelm Holsting, Fokus på internationale 
operationer [Focus on International Operations] (Royal Danish Defence College, 
2006).
24 This and the following section are based on my articles in the festschrift on the 
occasion of the 175th anniversary of the Royal Danish Defence College, see note 3.
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must be able to fulfil the role of diplomat in international operations and serve 
as a manager in the national military bureaucracy.
The modern officer
The basic assumption is that the modern officer – in any case, above a certain 
level – must have an insight into what characterises a scientific approach to 
war and warfare. The officer must understand the profession’s core theories, be 
able to make critical analyses, have a thorough knowledge of the profession’s 
methodology and its associated strengths and weaknesses, and be able to adapt 
these methods to the conduct of military operations and to create new know-
ledge regarding war and warfare based on his experiences. He must also be able 
to compare and evaluate different methods and critically evaluate their results. 
He must also have in-depth knowledge of the limitations and uncertainties that 
characterise the discipline of military science. Finally, he must be able to make 
use of scientific publications and source material.
Through the use of relevant analysis and research methods, the officer must 
also be able to apply different theoretical models to the solution of complex 
problems. He must be able to justify his choice of solutions to such problems 
by applying scientific methods and exploiting the results of research in relevant 
disciplines.
Challenging the traditions
The academisation of the officer education system will have extensive conse-
quences that challenge time-honoured traditions regarding the education of of-
ficers. A systematic officer education has a long history in Denmark: the Naval 
Academy was founded in 1701 and must be the world’s oldest naval officers’ 
school; the Military Academy (the army officers’ school) was founded in 1713; 
and the Royal Danish Defence College was established in 1830. It must be stressed 
that academisation is not a goal in itself. It is one of several elements needed to 
create the right type of education. There can be no doubt that the emphasis on 
military skills in the officer education programme is a great advantage and should 
be maintained, also in the future, but this means that finding the correct balance 
between general academic and professional military competencies presents a 
serious challenge. It is stated in the introduction that the strategic environment 
is characterised by a fundamental unpredictability and by the fact that armed 
force is used in many different types of conflicts characterised by a significant 
degree of complexity. Obviously, the ability of an officer to manage this com-
plexity demands a comprehensive understanding of the function and application 
of military force as well as knowledge about the context within which this force 
is to be used. Understanding of the national and international political systems is 
therefore a crucial and fundamental element. Therefore, the officer’s profession 
requires a solid theoretical platform, including an understanding of the theory 
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of war, conflict, and the use of military force, as well as an understanding of the 
premises on which a given military doctrine is based, and, not least, the ability 
to deviate from the doctrine when the premises change.
In addition, steadily increasing demands are made on the military bureau-
cracy to justify its activities and to carry out its tasks economically and in ac-
cordance with civil administrative standards. As is the case for the government 
administration as a whole, the use of public finances by the armed forces must 
be accounted for in a systematic and credible way. This requires a broad and 
detailed understanding of management methods based on analytical thinking as 
well as the necessary management skills to deal with complex issues that are not 
necessarily military in nature.
Academisation is also a means of creating a flexible officer corps that is 
capable of critical thinking and unafraid to express its thoughts. The unpredict-
ability that characterises the situation of the armed forces today requires the 
ability to quickly adjust and adapt doctrines, technology and organisation to 
the challenges of the future. A broad theoretical platform can contribute to such 
a readiness for change, supplemented, of course, by more practical professional 
skills. 
The demands placed on the officer to be able to act decisively and effec-
tively will continue to increase. The officer is primarily trained as a leader and 
must therefore be able to act. In contrast to other professions, the armed forces 
cannot recruit a military leader or commander from the street. It takes 15 to 20 
years to train a military leader, from the moment he or she completes the basic 
officers’ course until he or she is qualified for promotion to lieutenant colonel or 
commander and thus qualified to command a battalion, wing or mid-sized naval 
unit (e.g. frigate or destroyer). The officer’s education consists of a combination 
of practical training and advanced academic education. This means that the 
officer must prove that he or she has acquired the required skills before being 
promoted. This sets the military profession apart from other professions, since 
its ultimate consequence is the destruction of human life, which may include 
the loss of one’s own life or the lives of one’s subordinates. Obviously, acade-
misation cannot be divorced from the interaction between theoretical education 
and practical service, which is the cornerstone of the officer’s education. This 
interaction is also a prerequisite for including experience-based teaching in the 
advanced education of officers, because synthesis and synergy with the theore-
tical education are so important. The students thereby have the opportunity to 
draw on their personal experiences and reflect on them in a relevant theoretical 
context and at a relevant professional level.
It can be said that the impetus for academisation is, in this light, functional-
ly and technically and not only institutionally motivated. The issue of “academic 
or soldier” is often presented as a contradiction and a dilemma. This is not an 
especially fruitful approach. It is rather a paradox – two partially different forms 
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of logic that must be synchronized and at the same time balanced. On the one 
hand, the armed forces must be able to participate in, for example, international 
operations with officers who, as leaders, can act professionally and competently. 
On the other hand, the armed forces must have an officer corps that can develop 
the armed forces, for example, through studies, research and development.
The economic conditions for the armed forces require considerable focus 
on expenditures – as is the case for the whole public sector. The research base 
for the training must therefore be concentrated on military core competencies, 
with the military profession as the focal point. This is the discipline that we have 
identified as the science of war or War Studies, with its basis in studies of mili-
tary operations, strategy, doctrine development, the history of warfare, security 
policy, international politics and conflict theory as well as military leadership. 
The armed forces must not copy the educations offered at civilian universities 
but must focus on areas that can give the armed forces a unique and professio-
nally competent profile.
accreditation of the Joint Staff Course
Is is the intention that the advanced officer education should be accredited, so 
that after completing the Joint Staff Course, officers can receive a master’s degree 
in War Studies. This is most likely to be accomplished in close cooperation with 
Copenhagen University. There is at present increasing interest in the military di-
mension of security policy that can develop into a fruitful cooperation between 
the two educational institutions. The content of such a master’s programme 
will focus on the core military competencies, as described in the discussion on 
the science of war. These are largely the same disciplines taught to students on 
the present Joint Staff Course. The course has developed continuously through 
the years, primarily within the areas of foreign and security policy and defence 
policy. During the last five years, the teaching of operations has gone through a 
very dynamic development after officers with experience from the Balkans, Iraq 
and Afghanistan have been posted as instructors.
Since 1993, the Joint Staff Course has been organised in a decentralized 
and project-oriented syndicate structure, where learning is done by a combina-
tion of plenary lectures and subsequent work in syndicates. The students’ own 
professional knowledge and experiences therefore come into play in a relevant 
way. Each syndicate is assigned one instructor, a syndicate leader. This struc-
ture is used in most comparable institutions in the West. Originally, the course 
lasted nine months, and the students were selected after making an application. 
In 1999, the course was extended two months in order to teach technology 
and organisation and leadership, due to a large extent to the introduction into 
the armed forces of DeMap (Danish Armed Forces Management Project, a ma-
nagement and enterprise resource administration model) and DeMars (Danish 
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Armed Forces Management and Resource Management System, an IT platform 
for DeMap).
It is the declared aim of the course to develop an officer who has a joint 
orientation, and who can serve as a staff officer in a major tactical headquarters 
as well as in national and multinational headquarters at the operational and 
strategic level. A further goal is to develop the ability to serve as the chief of a 
section, branch and division in a headquarters. The course is divided into four 
modules and a number of inter-disciplinary projects. The module structure en-
sures focus on the individual disciplines.
The Institute of Strategy is responsible for a module that teaches the stu-
dents about the international system as well as the actions of states in relation 
to foreign, security and defence policies. Studies include the development of 
strategic concepts and the formulation of strategies; theories and concepts in 
international politics; developments in the theory of war and the art of war; 
international law; the strategic environment and its actors; and the origins of 
inter- and intra-state conflicts and how they may be managed. This module also 
includes a course in methodology to prepare the students for writing a thesis.
The Institute of Military Operations teaches a module on joint operations, 
including logistics, in a national and NATO/EU context as well as under a UN 
or OSCE mandate. The students’ ability to evaluate larger complex operational 
and logistic problems is developed and exercised, often under considerable time 
pressure. Furthermore, students learn to work with various tools needed for 
duties service in international staffs.
The Institute for Operational Support and Simulation conducts a module 
that gives the students the necessary theoretical, methodological and analytical 
skills to be able to understand and contribute to the solution of technological 
problems in the armed forces.
The Institute of Leadership and Organization teaches a module that gives 
the students the necessary theoretical, methodological and analytical skills, so 
that they – in light of the distinctive character of the armed forces – can under-
stand and assume general organisational, leadership and management responsi-
bilities, with emphasis on development and leadership in relation to change. 
A significant portion of the instruction and work is in English, which is 
consistent with the priority that international operations have in the Danish 
armed forces. This creates a dilemma, however: Undoubtedly, globalisation 
and internationalization create the need to master at least one of the main 
foreign languages – primarily, English. This makes it also easier to create an 
international study environment attracting teachers and students from other 
countries. On the other hand, this lessens the depth of learning in some areas. 
In-depth assessments and analyses cannot be made in a foreign language, unless 
the students are especially well qualified, which requires some years of study. 
This is a very time-consuming course for the individual student and requires a 
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considerable capacity for study. The course contributes to a deeper knowledge 
of the basic conditions and demands of the military profession; and teaches the 
students to work in an analytical, methodical and disciplined way; and develops 
their social skills – which is facilitated by the syndicate structure. The course is 
highly important to the development of the personal and professional qualities 
required of staff officers and future leaders. 
To sum up, the content of the Joint Staff Course and the methods of in-
struction are commensurate with the high intellectual standards and academic 
abilities of the officers selected for course. The aim of the course is to foster the 
ability of the individual student to think and act independently and to develop 
his or her capacity for critical, constructive and creative thinking; and to provide 
a thorough understanding of the theoretical foundations of the military profes-
sion. The ability to think “outside the box” is a decisive quality in a modern staff 
officer, but social competencies also carry great weight. The ability to cooperate 
and communicate with others is cultivated through the teaching and learning 
methods used in the course.
In addition, the officers are indoctrinated in staff ethics, which entail that 
the staff officer presents his superiors with solutions that are based on a sound 
(scientific) and professional operational assessment, rather than on his ideas 
about what his superiors might like to hear. The training is conducted in the 
best traditions of the Prussian general staff, and like the general staff course at 
the Kriegsakademie in Berlin under Moltke the Elder, it is an elite education with 
an emphasis on academics. This is not a popular view everywhere today, but it 
is the core of an advanced military education which inculcates professionalism; 
analytical ability; systematic, methodical and independent thought; and perso-
nal integrity in the officers who will lead the way and drive the development of 
the armed forces.
Challenges in the academisation process
It is hopefully clear that the basic elements required in the Master of War Stu-
dies programme are present to a great extent. The relevant disciplinary modules 
have a qualitative level that in almost all areas is as high as the education of-
fered at universities, and in certain cases even higher. In addition, the methods 
of instruction used on the Joint Staff Course are generally more advanced than 
those of the universities. The learning process is, therefore, more effective. This 
is also due to other factors: The students on the Joint Staff Course are older than 
university students and often more mature and better motivated. They receive 
their normal salaries during the course, but they also often have family respon-
sibilities, which can be a great burden during a demanding course of study and 
thus require considerable self-discipline to manage successfully.
The academisation process will have many consequences that in the long 
run will break with the traditional educational culture within the armed forces. 
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We must primarily accustom ourselves to an academic approach to knowledge: 
Knowledge shall in principle derive from a hypothesis, and arguments are for 
the most part more important than solutions. It is important to be able to pro-
duce and systematize new knowledge as well as to continually evaluate this 
knowledge critically. Finally, it is important to communicate new knowledge to 
the relevant research environments and to a broader audience.
Also the form of teaching demands a certain cultural transformation. The 
Joint Staff Course at the Royal Danish Defence College is, as mentioned above, 
characterised by significant intellectual demands and hard work. Attendance is 
compulsory, which is not the case in other institutions of higher learning. There 
will be a demand for increased freedom to design a more individual course of 
study perhaps consisting of more seminars, workshops, projects and fewer lec-
tures. There will be an understandable demand for greater opportunity for in-
depth studies. These demands may collide with the understandable demands on 
the part of the armed forces for maximum effectiveness, so that the education 
programme takes as little time as possible away from active service. To address 
this issue, the prudent use of distance learning looks promising; however, fos-
tering a professional ethos and developing networks can only take place when 
the students attend the course in person. Therefore, the correct balance must be 
found between the two methods of instruction. Also, distance learning at this 
level has not yet been sufficiently developed and would require considerable 
investment.
There is a tendency in the Danish university community – and in any case, 
in the government – to critically examine the effectiveness of institutions of 
higher learning, with the exact same aim: generating greater efficiency at less 
cost. Hopefully, it will be possible to meet in a fruitful compromise between 
more independent study methods and effectiveness.
As referred to above, the teaching in the core competencies must be research-
based if the Joint Staff Course is to be accredited as an academic education. 
This requires employing researchers with graduate degrees and documented 
research experience. This is not a problem with respect to civilian employees. 
The large number of qualified applicants for positions in the newly established 
Danish Institute for Military Studies confirms this. However, there is a problem 
regarding the recruitment of academically qualified military personnel, i.e. 
officers. The Royal Danish Defence College has until now benefited from the 
fact that the officers who are posted as teachers and syndicate leaders are the 
elite of the officer corps.
However, it is a problem that these excellent officers with promising ca-
reers only remain at the College for a short period of time, typically two years. 
Such a short tour of duty is completely insufficient for carrying out research. 
Therefore, efforts are being made to find a number of officers who have the 
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intellectual capacity to engage in research, and provide them with the necessary 
education to conduct research at an academic level.
These military researchers will have to accept an alternative career path 
in which their research background is developed through service in the Danish 
Institute for Military Studies, the Danish Institute for International Studies, the 
Defence Intelligence Service, the Defence Ministry, and possible participation in 
exchange programmes with universities, and, if financial resources are found, 
exchange programmes with comparable foreign institutions. It is, however, im-
portant that these officers maintain and enhance their professional qualifications 
by serving regular tours of duty in international operations, which could be 
part of actual research projects and contribute invaluable empirical data. This 
illustrates the problem of balancing the theoretical/academic approach and the 
practical approach to professional development.
It is, however, quite crucial that both personnel and financial resources be 
allocated to establishing and maintaining a fruitful research environment that 
can produce new knowledge that supports the vital interaction between research 
and teaching. The Royal Danish Defence College is in this respect a small envi-
ronment that must necessarily enter into strategic alliances with relevant univer-
sities at home and abroad, just as alliances with foreign military education and 
research institutions are necessary if an international research environment is to 
be established. This is judged to be a necessity in a globalised world. It is also a 
requirement that the regulations governing academic institutions are followed 
and that criteria regarding e.g. appointments to scientific positions and to lea-
dership positions such as heads of institutes are met. Norms for the expenditure 
of time and resources must be defined for the research and educational activities 
conducted by each individual researcher, and funding for research must be pro-
vided to the institutes. A corps of external examiners, which should be expanded 
to include academics from international institutions, must be formed in order 
to ensure the quality and integrity of the examinations conducted by the Royal 
Danish Defence College.
THE VISION OF THE ROyAL DANISH DEFENCE COLLEGE
Since 2001, the Royal Danish Defence College has gone through an extensive 
transformation process with the aim of establishing an organisation that could 
realize its vision, which was formulated in the spring of 2001, and which, with 
minor amendments was incorporated in the defence agreement passed by Folke-
tinget, the Danish parliament in 2004. The vision is as follows:
The Royal Danish Defence College will be the internationally oriented know-
ledge centre of the Danish armed forces fulfilling the needs of  the armed forces, 
the total defence, and Danish society for research-based military training, de-
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velopment and consulting and knowledge dissemination at the university level 
within the fields of:
Security policy
Strategy and military operations, and
Military leadership
The Royal Danish Defence College will as the knowledge centre also fulfil the 
need for training, development, consulting and knowledge dissemination based 
on research by external institutions within the fields of:
Military psychology, pedagogy and organisation
Management and digital administration
Military technology, and
Foreign languages and intercultural competence
The Royal Danish Defence College was one of the institutions of the armed 
forces that were noticeably strengthened in connection with the defence agre-
ement of 2004. The organisational structure that was implemented on January 
1, 2006 is tailored to support the Royal Danish Defence College’s vision. When 
the organisation is fully manned with, among others, civilian academics who 
will comprise the cadre of researchers until they can be augmented with the 
necessary number of qualified military researchers, steps will be taken toward 
achieving accreditation. The foundation has been laid, but it is still shaky. A po-
licy change in the administration of military personnel is necessary, and a minor 
extension of resource allocations is a prerequisite for completing this process. 
The transformation of the Royal Danish Defence College is vital to the future 
recruitment of qualified officers, their retention in the armed forces, and last but 
not least, the development of the armed forces in an unpredictable and complex 
world. In 1842, the daily newspaper, Fædrelandet [The Fatherland], wrote this 
comment about the predecessor of the Royal Danish Defence College, the Royal 
Military College.
[the Royal Military College] must provide the Army not only with Officers who 
can skilfully conduct the sundry and peculiar Affairs of the Military but also 
with a permanent and forceful Cadre of Men of Science, who have completed 
the full Studies of the Disciplines in which they shall soon work and who will 
participate in the higher Education that can lift their Eyes beyond the narrow 
Limits of practical Military Service, and who have the ability to grasp and un-
derstand the Military Organism in its entirety. When such an Education is lack-
ing, every fundamental reform of the Military is fraught with insurmountable 
Difficulties.









WAR STUDIES AT THE FINNISH NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITy
Professor Pasi Kesseli 
The Finnish National Defence University
This autumn the Finnish National Defence University entered the joint Europe-
an academic education system introduced a year ago. This led to changes in the 
division of the subjects offered and in the contents of the university’s educational 
programme, including establishing a subject called War Studies.
To emphasise the academic character of the Finnish Defence University the 
current name, “War College”, will be changed at the beginning of 2007 to the 
National Defence University.
INTRODUCTION
The Finnish National Defence University is an academic establishment that plans 
and organises active officer education in Finland. We concentrate on researching 
into military sciences.
The research and teaching at the National Defence University play a role 
in forming Finnish national security and defence policy and contribute to both 
national and international security. As far as research is concerned, the Natio-
nal Defence University emphasises both basic and applied research in all our 
university’s disciplines. The university also offers its expertise, know-how and 
teaching to other areas of Finnish society.
Pedagogy was the first academic and scientific discipline at Cadet School. 
From the 1970s onwards, every cadet read pedagogy – not a lot of it – but 
enough to give the exam an academic flavour and to improve the cadets’ educa-
tional skills. Second, this laid a foundation for the further academisation of the 
exam. Another cornerstone in the cadets’ education included everyone having 
to write a study on a chosen subject. This was not restricted to pedagogy; tac-
tics, security policy, logistics and physical education were also permitted. This 
demanded, albeit implicitly, scientific approaches to all disciplines and subjects. 
Various scientific traditions did thus already exist when the current National 
Defence University was founded at the beginning of 1993, and when the next 
steps along its academic path were taken.
The seven faculties at our university represent the following scientific bran-
ches: strategy, operational art and tactics, military history, military pedagogy, 
management and leadership, military technology, military psychology, and mili-
tary sociology. Therefore, when the National Defence University was established 
by merging several separate military schools, it was not necessary to invent a 
new system of science in the Finnish academic community, as the disciplines of 
human and natural sciences which already existed could be applied for military 
purposes.
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ON MILITARy SCIENCES
Defining military sciences precisely is a difficult task. They are a complicated 
entity bound together by security threats, crises and wars, and the aim of pre-
venting such. It is, however, expected that in the changing world globalisation, 
population growth and increasing pressure on nature will strengthen the pos-
sibility of different crises emerging. In addition, changes to the world of business 
and employment caused by globalisation and huge developments in information 
technology will further accelerate global instability. Military sciences can thus 
no longer focus solely on military security and military defence issues; they have 
to be capable of analysing present and future threats on a wider security scale 
than just in the context of traditional conventional warfare.
As a military scientific university, the National Defence University is re-
sponsible for all the research, education and training challenges that a constant-
ly developing security environment poses to defence organisations and military 
installations, to officers and soldiers, as well as to other players who lend sub-
stance to defence issues. The National Defence University also tries critically and 
actively to define its role, position, status and the assignments associated with 
security, crises, wars and defence in a changing world.
The National Defence University’s research and educational activities also 
take into account today’s cultural, political and economic challenges that influ-
ence the development of national and international academic education. For 
example, this autumn the Finnish National Defence University joined the joint 
European three-level academic education system when our youngest cadet course 
initiated its studies according to the new programme, the Bologna process. 
However, the transition to a point at which the new system will cover all levels 
of our officer education will take years. This is why, for example, the cadets who 
began their studies this autumn will begin their staff officer and general staff 
officer studies only after about ten years. Until then, the older education system 
will produce cadets and later officers alongside the cadets and officers who are 
studying on the new programme. Nevertheless, this will not hinder collecting 
and transferring experiences from the new system to the ongoing programmes.
In the Bologna process, the contents of the education programmes were 
revised. The division of the subjects offered at our university was also altered 
because it soon became apparent that some subjects – including strategy and 
military history – had too few study weeks to qualify as separate subjects in 
the new programme. This would have made it impossible to write theses about 
areas from these subjects. To retain all the subjects that were deemed important 
to officer education, the existing subjects were combined into four new enti-
ties: War Studies, Management and Leadership, Military Pedagogy and Military 
Technology.
Establishing a multi-disciplinary subject called War Studies was an impor-
tant change, and this entailed combining the administration of strategy, opera-
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tional art and tactics and military history. Nevertheless, these subjects have been 
retained as independent yet mutually complementary disciplines.
The Finnish language has but one word, sotataito, for the terms war stu-
dies, military art and the art of war. How then do we define war studies and 
military art or the art of war, of which the two latter may be regarded as syno-
nymous? This is a rather important question.
The basis of War Studies as a subject was constructed broadly based on 
the definition of the term military art. This allowed us to link research and edu-
cation which go hand in hand in the academic community in that research pro-
vides education with the newest knowledge. However, War Studies as a subject 
should not be confused with the term military art in warfare. At the National 
Defence University, War Studies is not a discipline or a branch of science, but a 
multi-disciplinary subject which contains three independent disciplines: strategy, 
operational art and tactics and military history, which all have their separate 
scientific philosophies.
Military art, which is usually divided into strategy, operational art and 
tactics, may be defined as “the skill to lead military forces to achieve war aims”. 
If we define the term in this way, it also mirrors the aims of War Studies at the 
Finnish National Defence University, which are to give our students the skills to 
face challenges during peacetime and during different types of crises (including 
war) at all levels of the military hierarchy. From our point of view, the definition 
of military art determines which kinds of entities and sectors we concentrate 
on while researching into and studying strategy, operational art and tactics and 
military history, to ensure we always have the freshest knowledge possible in our 
educational programmes.
In Finland, researching into and teaching War Studies are carried out with-
in a rather complex framework. War Studies provides students with knowledge 
of how questions regarding waging war and international security, including 
related theories, have developed, how they appear today and how one might 
anticipate their developing in the future, as well as the knowledge to explain and 
understand the art of war. In addition, War Studies provides students with the 
necessary skills to research into the area of military art.
If we open up the definition of the art of war it might help the reader to 
understand the research and educational interests at Finnish National Defence 
University. At present, military art is usually divided into three levels, according 
to way of action into tactics, operational art and strategy or according to influ-
ence or effect of action into tactical, operational and strategic influence.
A rather commonly used definition of military art stems from the Prussian 
general and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. According to him, milita-
ry art is the skill of using given resources in a battle. In addition to the actu-
al fighting, using given resources includes preparing for battle, planning, 
mobilising, armaments as well as equipment issues and training. In order to 
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separate the battle and the preparations for battle from war and the preparation 
for war, Clausewitz divided military art into two levels: tactics and strategy. 
According to him, tactics was the use of armed forces in the battle and strategy 
correspondingly the use of battles for achieving war objectives.1 Despite the fact 
that Clausewitz is still a very regularly quoted military theorist, his definition 
of military art no longer fully meets current views. Today, we divide military 
art into three levels. In addition, Clausewitz’s idea that military art is the skill 
of using given resources in a battle is too restrictive as a definition, as today 
military art also includes the preparations for and prevention of war.
The Clausewitzian way of defining military art and the levels of military art 
in particular was, however, the prevailing model of thinking in the Anglo-Saxon 
world up to the years following the Second World War. If the element “art” in 
“military art” may seem to contain such mental aspects of military art as doctri-
nes or principles of war, military art has evolved throughout history whereas 
the development of military technology seems to have happened through great 
changes. However, as technological and social development enable new inno-
vations in military issues, knowledge of the development of military art is ex-
tremely important because military technology influences military art and vice 
versa. When we study the past, we are able to understand which phenomena 
characterised warfare in different eras, why these phenomena were in charge of 
the development, and why and how they led the development of military art to 
new ground.
As late as at the end of the 18th century, wars consisted of two entities: 
temporally short tactical battles and strategic force concentrations from one 
place to another to get the advantage of amassing troops in the battle itself. In 
Napoleonic France at the beginning of the 19th century, thoughts surfaced that 
gave rise to a new definition of the art of war, operational art. As the strength 
of the armed forces grew remarkably after universal conscription was adopted, 
the need also grew to organise the goals and results of individual battles into a 
series of battles with broader aims. In other words, the overall goal of combi-
ning the aims of separate battles was to neutralise the enemy’s fighting power 
so that he would be incapable of continuing fighting. Thus separate battles with 
combined aims formed operations that linked goals and gains in the battlefield 
to war objectives.
The idea of having the third operational level in the art of war between tactics 
and strategy initially spread from France to Prussia, and later on to Germany 
and the Soviet Union. A triangular division was not, however, completely 
unknown in the Anglo-Saxon world, where the “march manoeuvres” of the 
Prussian Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke the Elder had occupied the thoughts 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret,  
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 127–128.
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of military theorists ever since the end of the 19th century up to and including 
the Second World War. Although this division into tactical, operational and 
strategic levels was perhaps not at all as clear in the Anglo-Saxon world as in 
Germany or the Soviet Union, a triangular division also existed in Great Britain 
and in the United States, only with different names.2 This was also the situation 
in Finland. Operational art as a definition which originated in Germany and the 
Soviet Union had already appeared in Finnish military thinking by the 1920s. 
However, before the World Wars a great proportion of Finnish officers had 
divided military art into two levels. This raises a question: during the Winter 
War and the Continuation War how were we Finns able to plan and carry out 
a number of rather big operations? Presumably in practice Finns also divided 
military art into a triangular style like the Germans or the Soviets, and only 
had different names for operational art and strategy. Before the Winter War, 
the term “strategy” was quite proximate to the definition of operational art. 
This may be seen, for example, in the division of subjects at the War University. 
In the 1920s, subjects were grouped so that tactics formed its own entity and 
strategy was a part of military history, which included aspects that are linked 
today to both operational art and strategic studies. At the end of the 1930s, the 
increasing role of industrial and economic issues behind warfare forced us to 
change the division of subjects at the War University. This marked the birth of 
military geography, a subject that included, for instance, military-political issues 
and geopolitics, issues that are included in strategy today. Strategy at that time 
was mainly a synonym for today’s operational art, for example the inclusion of 
front operations in the curricula of strategic studies.3 After the Second World 
2 J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 
1926), p. 88–89; Glantz, David M.: “Soviet Operational Formation for Battle: A 
Perspective”, Military Review February (1983): 4; Stephen P. Aubin and Robert E. 
Kells Jr: “Air, Land and Battle Doctrine: Soviet Strategy Revisited”, Military Review, 
October (1985): 50–51; John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History 
(New York: Cornwell University Press, 1988), p. 17 and interview with professor 
Brian Bond at King’s College, London 12 November 1998.
3 Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 60–61; Paul Albert Dyster, “In the 
Wake of the Tank: The 20th Century Evolution of the Theory of Armoured Warfare”, 
doctoral dissertation (Baltimore, Maryland, University Microfilms International, 
Dissertation Information Service, Michigan 1988), p. 221; Pasi Kesseli, “Sotataito [The 
Art of War], Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu-lehti”, Review of Finnish National Defence 
College, no. 2 (2005): 7; an e-mail letter from Docent, Colonel Vesa Tynkkynen to 
the author 14 October 2005 and Sotakorkeakoulu 25-v. 1924–1949 [War College 25 
Years] (Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otavan kirjapaino [Otava Publishing House], 1948), p. 
45 and 66. The highest level of military art in the Anglo-Saxon world above tactics 
and strategy was grand strategy, which was almost equivalent to our present day 
definition of strategy. Tactics/strategy/grand strategy thinking refers to British Sir 
Basil Liddell Hart who was one of the military theorists who had an influence on 
mechanized warfare in the early 20th century. According to Vesa Tynkkynen, at the 
end of the 1920s operative home exercises at the Finnish War College were a part of 
strategic studies. One of these exercises was, for example, ”Defensive army operations 
in the Karelian Isthmus”.
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War, overlapping definitions led to a situation in which operational art stabilised 
its position between tactics and strategy, and strategy extended from military 
matters to social issues between political-military decision-making as well.4
After the Second World War, the content of strategy began having more 
and more political influence, and differences in the definitions in Western coun-
tries grew. Finally, at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, after the Vietnam War, 
definitions were standardised so that the Anglo-Saxon world also assumed ope-
rational art between tactics and strategy was defined to cover the political level 
and political issues of war.5
Operational art today is generally defined in two ways: by describing the 
aims that are pursued in an operation or by describing the components that 
form an operation. The Swiss military theorist Antoine Henri de Jomini repre-
sents the first way when he writes that “grand tactics connect individual tactical 
battles to operations, where the goal is to make the enemy incapable of continu-
ing fighting”. The thoughts of the British theorist of mechanised warfare, John 
F.C. Fuller, comply with this view. He wrote that “a grand tactician does not 
try to destroy his enemy physically but more to paralyse him mentally”. In the 
terminology of both Jomini and Fuller, grand tactics may be seen as equivalent 
to today’s definition of operational art, something between tactics and strategy.6 
Helmut von Moltke the Elder represents the second, more pragmatic way of 
defining operational art. According to Moltke, operational art is the “ability 
to recognise changes in the situation, anticipate necessary orders and carry out 
preparations according to the plans”. British researcher Christopher Bellamy 
expresses similar views. According to Bellamy, operational art is the “skill to de-
ploy and use (military) forces in the battlefield in accordance with the demands 
of the situation and plan these manoeuvres in the map”.7
In Finland, a much-quoted definition of military art stems from the Hand-
book of Strategy (1983) by the well-known military historian, Colonel Sampo 
Ahto. This definition, which in itself is close to Clausewitz’s definition, also 
takes into consideration the operational level of the art of war. According to 
Sampo Ahto, military art, which is usually divided into strategy, operational art 
and tactics, is the “skill to lead military forces to reach war aims”. When this 
4 An e-mail from Docent, Brigadier Vesa Tynkkynen to the author, 6 September 2006.
5 A number of things had an influence on the adoption of the definition “operational 
art” in the Anglo-Saxon world. The Vietnam War was one of them, the Yom Kippur 
War in the Middle East the second and distinction between definitions in the NATO 
countries the third. To make a consistent way of thinking possible, the definitions had 
to be unified.
6 Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, p. 88–89 and Henri Jomini, Art of War 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1971), p. 69–70. Both Fuller 
and Jomini, who is one of Fuller’s central sources, speak of tactics, grand tactics and 
strategy.
7 Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare…, p. 60–61 and Richard E. 
Simpkin, Race to the Swift. Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: 
Brassey´s Defence Publishers, 1985), p. 24.
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definition is complemented by the interpretation of the Department of Tactics at 
the Finnish National Defence University of the contents of strategy, operational 
art and tactics, we can form some kind of an understanding of how military 
art has been understood in Finland over the few past decades: “Strategy is the 
preparation and use of all states’ resources aimed to reach security goals directly 
or indirectly both in peacetime and wartime and set down by political leaders”. 
In this context, operational art is the “skill to plan, prepare and lead series of 
tactical battles”. However, this rather pragmatic definition is rendered complete 
with an additional attribute: “Operations and campaigns (a parallel definition 
to operation) include offensive and defensive battles and delay action”. In ad-
dition, in Finnish military art, the Army, Navy and Air Force have their own 
interpretations of operational art but, when needed, the actions of services have 
been combined. Operational art has also often been linked to formations, in Fin-
land to brigades and Army corps. Today this view is no longer that pragmatic, 
but operational art is also defined according to operational aims. Tactics in Fin-
nish military art has been understood as “planning and preparations for battles, 
skills to fight and leading troops in the battle.8
The invention of the operational level between the tactical and strategic 
levels in military art in the 19th century is, however, certainly not the endpoint in 
classifying military art. In fact, references that concepts are being reinterpreted 
are reappearing. In the US 2030 doctrinal concept it states that an attack will be 
started from a strategic distance, the basic idea being to change an operational 
attack into tactical defence, in other words seize targets, from which it is pos-
sible to control the battle space with firepower and finally to destroy (with pre-
cision weapons) the opponent’s forces that were compelled to move. According 
to this, operational and strategic targets can be achieved with tactical success. 
If this is true, why do we need the operational level of military art, if strategic 
aims guide tactical battles? In fact, defining the term “military art” becomes 
even more difficult, as the framework of the term becomes blurred. In addition 
to the operational and tactical levels of warfare overlapping in the new US mi-
litary concept, the operational level of military art also blends more and more 
with the strategic level, including civil-military planning, decision-making and 
the use of resources.
What was said above urges us to consider whether, in the future, there 
will be battlefield operational aims or a need for operational art at all, if the 
amount of troops is reduced so much that the goals of wars can be achieved in 
single battles in the same way as when large conscription armies came to the 
theatre of war in the beginning of the 19th century. If we can no longer perceive 
8 Sampo Ahto, Sotataito (The Art of War), Strategian käsikirja (Handbook on Strategy), 
Valtion painatuskeskus (National Publishing House), 1983, p. 121 and concepts of the 
definitions of military art at the Department of Tactics at the Finnish National Defence 
College.
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any operational aims, have we returned to the Clausewitzian way of understan-
ding war in two levels so that tactics equates to the use of the armed forces in 
battle and strategy the use of battles to achieve war objectives? Or is it so that 
the operational level has always been a part of military art, and we have only 
associated it in various ways; in some places operational art has been regarded 
as fighting at planning level, i.e. how to use forces in the battlefield, whilst else-
where it has been regarded as deploying forces and organising different military 
functions in the area of operations. If we appraise the role of operational art in 
the future battlefield, it is useful to consider it from the viewpoint of the latter 
part of the compound noun “operational art”, i.e. art that may be regarded as 
the skill of doing things connected to operations. Therefore, is skill an ability to 
apply doctrines, tactical and operational principles and lessons learned on the 
battlefield? If it is, we can speak of a game eye, i.e. the skill to adapt tactical and 
operational principles to existing resources according to the demands of the sit-
uation. So, is operational art a skill to combine the view of the situation, doctri-
nal principles and future expectations on the battlefield? Is this the operational 
art of the future that provides answers to the challenges on today’s and future 
complex battlefield? How does this deviate from our traditional operational art 
and tactics? In theory, from the point of view of the philosophy of military art, 
obviously very little.
Regardless of what has been said above, definitions of the levels of military 
art have existed in Finland without formally approved terms. There are proba-
bly many reasons for this. However, one of the most important reasons might be 
that definitions in warfare on the whole have been understood in Finland to be 
so ambiguous that a common system of definitions has been considered either 
unnecessary or too complicated to construct. This does not mean that there have 
been no definitions in the research of military art in Finland. We do have defini-
tions, but they have usually been defined in each research field according to the 
needs of the researchers or the research.
To some extent, internationalisation also confuses the definition of mili-
tary art. Because Finnish units are nowadays essential elements of multinational 
troops on different peacekeeping missions, we prepare to take part in Rapid 
Deployment Forces (RDF) in the European Union, and global cooperation in 
Multi National Experimentation (MNE) exercise has also started, so it is only 
natural that definitions of military art must be standardised. The first steps have 
been taken, including translating Guidance for Operational Planning (GOP) 
– including definitions – into Finnish (FINGOP). In addition to standardising 
definitions, FINGOP’s has been to try and take into consideration local special 
demands as well. However, learning about a new culture does not occur over-
night. This also poses – and has already posed – challenges to both the research 
into and teaching of military art, as our traditional understanding of the levels 
of military art is changing, or at least we can say that the scale of military art is 
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changing by virtue of internationalisation. However, it also has to be said that 
somehow the Finnish practical way of tying the levels of military art to the size 
of the organisations or to the range of the areas of responsibility helps us to re-
vise the definitions. It remains to be seen whether the definitions described above 
are enough, if ever-smaller and more scattered forces will have more and more 
challenging tasks on an ever-larger battlefield.
A lucid system of definitions is one of science’s basic issues. Thus military-
scientific research needs at least disciplinary definition analyses and science phi-
losophies. Probably also some kind of universal definition analysis would be ne-
cessary to perceive the main know-how in research both in the National Defence 
University and in the Finnish Defence Forces. The disciplines that apply the phi-
losophies of common sciences – for example, military history (history), military 
pedagogy (pedagogy) or military technology (technology) – have not had any 
special difficulties in creating their scientific philosophies because they can be 
constructed on the same philosophical basis as their “mother” sciences. As far as 
the subject of War Studies is concerned, the situation is slightly different because 
two of the three disciplines in it are multi-disciplinary. Therefore the idea that 
War Studies as a subject could have a universal scientific philosophy seems at 
least challenging, if not impossible. We therefore came to the decision that War 
Studies includes three independent disciplines that all have their own scientific 
philosophies. Definitions and scientific philosophy in strategic studies are based 
on the philosophies of political sciences and history, international politics, and 
military strategy. In military history, the scientific philosophy is sought from ge-
neral history. It should, however, be noted that at the Finnish National Defence 
University, the research into and teaching of military history concentrates on 
the history of operational art and tactics, and therefore its scientific philosophy 
is also partly based on the scientific philosophy of operational art and tactics. 
The question of a scientific philosophy in particular is important in operational 
art and tactics, because even within the subject of War Studies, operational art 
and tactics are already a multi-disciplinary spectrum of anthropology and na-
tural science applied to military purposes. Partly because of this fragmented 
and multi-disciplinary character, the scientific philosophy of operational art and 
tactics is still being defined and in part this has been a conscious choice. The con-
struction of a general definitional system has, however, been started. The aim of 
this work is, by means of discussion analysis, to introduce the central definitions 
in operational art and tactics into research and teaching both at our National 
Defence University and in the Finnish Armed Forces.
Regardless of the above, people who are familiar with the disciplines within 
War Studies may be concerned with the possibility to unify strategy, operational 
art and tactics and military history in War Studies to form just one discipline. 
Perhaps we should ask ourselves how we can acquire scientific knowledge of 
strategy, operational art and tactics and military history? This question might 
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help us to get on the track of a general scientific philosophy in War Studies. To-
day, however, we do not think like this. It would be useful to ask ourselves why 
three or four disciplines (strategy, operational art, military history and even tac-
tics separated from operational art and tactics) have now been combined? Does 
War Studies as presented above consist of the right combination with which to 
unify the levels of military art as a subject? Is something central in military art 
still missing, such as leadership and command issues or perhaps something else? 
Or is our way, the Finnish way, of studying and teaching military art only an ad-
ministrative entirety? So far, we do not know. But we must be ready to consider 
these matters with an open mind.
War Studies is an administrative entity where the concept of the art of 
war combines the three separate disciplines and their aims. Responsibilities in 
research and education in War Studies are also divided into three faculties; the 
Department of Strategic Studies, the Department of Tactics and the Department 
of War History, each representing distinct perspectives and methods of studying 
war and international security.
Strategic studies in War Studies are an approach and a line of action that 
focus on the promotion of the security objectives of a state or an alliance. Thus, 
strategic studies are concerned with political, military and economic issues. One 
special sector in strategic studies is military strategy. This can be defined as the 
means of using armed forces to attain security objectives of a state or alliance. In 
addition, strategic studies are closely linked to political science and international 
relations, and they contain matters from these disciplines as well.
The second discipline, operational art and tactics, is in itself already a mul-
ti-disciplinary branch of science that applies the philosophies of civilian sciences 
to the study of warfare. The research philosophy of operational art and tactics is 
based on a rather wide range of philosophies, methods and scientific traditions 
of common human and natural sciences. In this framework, operational art and 
tactics focuses on war and crisis environment and the actual planning and exe-
cution of operations and battles. Objects of the research into and teaching of 
operational art and tactics include operational doctrines, battle-technical and 
tactical principles ranging from individual soldiers to units, military organisa-
tions, different weapons, command, control and communication and reconnais-
sance systems, mobility, logistics and systems of war economy, and the inter-
action between them.
Military history is a logical part of this. It uses tactical, operational and 
strategic analyses to try to shape our picture of warfare of the past to help us 
understand the national and international art of war today. In military history 
at the Finnish National Defence University we examine how wars and crises 
have changed and how the Western art of war has developed. Military theories, 
thoughts and phenomena that were typical of various eras in the past and that 
have headed the development of military art from one era to another, play a 
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central role in this. The history of military organisations in a social framework 
is also included in the field of military history, as well as contemporary military 
history and the development of research methodology.
FROM RESEARCH TO EDUCATION
As the main task of the Finnish National Defence University is the education 
of officers, research is closely linked to education. Therefore, the research am-
bitions of the faculties that represent the different disciplines in War Studies 
mostly run parallel with the contents of the curricula. Research at the National 
Defence University produces different types of research work to two main cli-
ents: ourselves for teaching and to the Finnish Armed Forces.
Research at the Finnish National Defence University is divided into basic 
research and applied research. Within War Studies, each discipline has defined 
its own aims of research, bearing in mind how we can offer our students the la-
test knowledge possible. This know-how is acquired thanks to the research our 
lecturers perform by taking part in various research projects and by guiding our 
students’ research activities to topics where the acquiring of new knowledge is 
deemed to be important.
The overall aim of research at the National Defence University is to link 
the themes to the research aims and projects of the Finnish Armed Forces. This 
is performed in two ways: first, our lecturers and researchers are involved in 
many joint research projects with the Armed Forces. Such projects are usually 
supervised by higher echelons, but the research also produces new knowledge 
that is transmitted to the contents of our teaching. Secondly, methodological 
research education carried out at the National Defence University produces aca-
demically trained experts for various planning, command, training, research and 
development tasks within the Armed Forces. Theses are written at every level 
of officer training at the Finnish National Defence University, during bachelor 
and master studies, on staff officer courses and in general staff officer courses. 
Moreover, in further education the students write different types of essays and 
reports. Our faculties – bar one – have their own doctoral studies programmes 
and at the moment the last one is also preparing one. All the papers mentioned 
above are able to produce at the very least a limited amount of new knowledge 
if their aims were defined properly.
Today, the research conducted at the National Defence University still pur-
sues its role within our Armed Forces. At the National Defence University, we 
of course emphasise that the research should be academic, open, autonomous 
and objective basic research which produces, for example, definition researches, 
doctrinal analyses and background investigations of various defence systems. It 
would be desirable if such research works were ordered by our higher echelons 
and the themes of these studies were connected to the long-time development 
of our Armed Forces. This would enable us to link the newest research and 
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education. Doctoral dissertations serve as good models for this kind of research, 
and regardless of whether they are independent basic studies or applied research 
linked to wider research projects, they produce new knowledge both to develop 
the Armed Forces and to improve officer education at our National Defence 
University.
If our higher command sets the deadlines for the completion of our re-
search tasks far enough ahead, the National Defence University can find suitable 
persons to head these research tasks. In addition, we can divide the tasks into 
smaller units that can also yield theses at different levels of officer education. 
We are thus able to achieve three important goals in research and education in 
War Studies. Firstly, our instructors can perform their own independent research 
according to given research goals which makes our instructors prepared to lead 
our student officers to the newest knowledge in the areas in which our instruc-
tors have specialised. An ideal situation would be if the person in charge of a 
research area were an officer preparing his or her doctoral dissertation, in addi-
tion to being able to motivate the student officers who are preparing their theses 
in sub-sectors of the research project. The Armed Forces could thus also develop 
experts in the research projects that they deem important. Secondly, even during 
the research process, our student officers can be taken as members into our 
scientific community and be committed to the planning of education. Thirdly, 
but by no means least importantly, by combining research and education we can 
develop our students’ independent thinking in military art. The final goal is an 
academic approach to everyday working life, so we do not pressure our student 
officers to learn particular issues but rather provide a broader view.
Applicative research at the Finnish National Defence University plays a 
minor role than that of basic research because of the less academic character 
of applicative research. Typical examples of applicative research of military art 
at the National Defence University include research projects into the areas of 
futurology and networking where our personnel have the best and latest know-
ledge in our Armed Forces. Tactics of branches and services also belong to this 
category. In this way, applicative research also furnishes education with new 
know-how. In addition, we utilise knowledge produced elsewhere in the Armed 
Forces and at civilian universities.
REVIEW OF THE CONTENTS OF THE EDUCATION
War Studies is divided into compulsory basic studies and subject studies that 
include a main subject and at least one secondary subject. In addition, the stu-
dents at all levels of officer education prepare research work connected to their 
main subject. The aim of War Studies in our officer education programme is 
– depending on whether War Studies is the students’ main subject or secondary 
subject – for our students to achieve at the least sufficient skills in their officer 
careers in all disciplines represented by War Studies. In addition, on the master’s 
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and postgraduate study programmes our students are taught to apply academic 
knowledge and scientific methods in their professional lives, and thus become 
experts and developers in their own special area. War Studies has to be chosen as 
either the main subject or secondary subject, but otherwise students can choose 
their combination of subjects at will. Compared to our former educational sys-
tem, all officers do not now receive an identical education, but they specialise in 
the main subject selected.
The curricula of the faculties involved in teaching military art at our uni-
versity reflect the desire to maintain freshness in the teaching. The targets of 
research activities are based on our own disciplinary interests. However, the 
research runs parallel to the aims mentioned in the overall strategy of the Na-
tional Defence University. In addition, the needs of our clients – for example, 
studies in current affairs and expert opinions – can also be linked rather well to 
the educational aims of strategy, military history and operational art and tactics, 
if we have set the goals far enough ahead and have the patience to give time to 
the research.
Disciplinary perspectives to War Studies govern, however, the contents of 
the research activities and teaching. One crucial perspective is the definition of 
the art of war. Tactics includes phenomena on the battlefield, operational art 
covers planning and the use of armed forces in military operations, and strategic 
studies are linked to overall security issues. Military history supports all of the 
above so that the main focus is on the history of operational art and tactics, 
while the history of strategy is connected more to research and education in 
strategic studies.
Despite the different disciplinary perspectives of strategy, operational art 
and tactics and military history from the viewpoint of the levels of military art, 
the disciplines do also overlap. According to traditional thinking, operational 
art, an effort which aims to prevent the opponent’s battle according to plans, 
combines tactical goals and results on the battlefield to strategic war aims. In 
any case there is reason to remember that tactical results may also influence war 
aims, that a successful operation can lead to a situation that ends the war and 
that security aims can be reached by strategic means without using armed force. 
In itself drawing a dividing line between strategy, operational art and tactics is 
difficult especially if military art is seen to be military action aimed at a certain 
destination: it is not easy to answer the question where the dividing line runs 
between tactical and operative action or between operative and strategic effect. 
We do not, however, consider the overlapping of the levels of military art to be 
a problem. First, the viewpoint comes from the disciplines that our faculties of 
Strategic Studies, the Department of Tactics and the Department of War History 
represent. Therefore, the danger that the same areas are taught or studied by 
more than one department at the National Defence University is theoretical. 
However, it might be an advantage that education in certain important issues 
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such as military theory or some regulations in warfare, for example the prin-
ciples of war, overlap when viewpoints differ. That indicates that the sectors of 
military art are firmly linked to one another.
The Department of Strategic Studies prepares research into strategy, secu-
rity policy and international cooperation and is responsible for teaching them. 
It is also the only research unit preparing basic research into and professio-
nal analyses of military strategy in Finland, although some research institutes 
and universities also prepare research close to military strategy. Strategic re-
search produces new knowledge for teaching strategy and security policy but 
also know-how for long-term perspective planning, development and decision-
 making in the Finnish Armed Forces. The Department of Strategic Studies has 
defined the central regional and functional areas of research as follows: 
Foreign and security policy in Finland
Finland’s strategic environment
Development of European security policy
Global security issues
Basic research in strategy.9
The task of the Department of Tactics is to produce knowledge with which to 
develop armed national defence. The results of the research form a theoretical 
base for operational art and tactics including for example definition analyses, 
analyses of research philosophy and research methodology of operational art 
and tactics, the use of research results in education, the use of the results in de-
velopment programmes, national and international publications (including ar-
ticles) and doctors in military sciences in the area of operational art and tactics. 
The research into operation skills and tactics also aims to strengthen our instruc-
tors’ academic approach to everyday working life and thus their participation in 
the development of national defence in the area of operational art and tactics.10
Operational art and tactics is divided into six extensive research areas. 
These are:
Theory in operational art and tactics
Changes in the social-technological environment of the total national de-
fence and its effect on the battlefield
The influence of changes in the main weapon systems on operational art 
and tactics
The influence of joint armed operations and joint total national defence 
operations on information
9 Research at Finnish National Defence University 2005–2008, Finnish National 
Defence University, web-pages, 18 September 2006.
10 A concept on the goals of the research of operational art and tactics in 2006. Passages 
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The use of simulation methods and simulation systems on the development 
of tactics and on education of tactical thinking
Research methodology of operational art and tactics.
Currently and in the near future the research areas listed above cover both the 
interests of the National Defence University as an academic university and the 
needs of our Armed Forces to develop operational art and tactics. The research 
is strongly future-oriented and aims to improve the performance of the total na-
tional defence by developing ideas and functional models that help us to create 
the best relative performance at different structural levels and optimise their 
use.
Perhaps the most important research area is the theory of operational art 
and tactics. Research on the basis of military art and operational art as a part of 
military art forms the foundation for all research activities. In this programme, 
we try to find out which kind of military theoretical thoughts are topical today 
and analyse their influence on Finnish strategic, operative and tactical thinking.
In the second area of research, we try to study the changes in the social-
technological environment of the total national defence and its effect on the 
battlefield. The field of armed defence is changing constantly, because aims to 
change the size of functional structure and communication systems at all levels 
are prevailing. When the total national defence is changing, this also brings pres-
sure to bear to study operative and tactical thinking in the new battle environ-
ment. Network enabled defence is connected to this area of research.
The third research area concerns the influence of changes in the main wea-
pon systems on operational art and tactics. The development of technology and 
the increase of international and internal changes of states cause pressure on 
the development of different systems of national defence. Within this research 
area, the aim is to survey what kind of challenges the technological develop-
ment poses to operative and tactical thinking and action, and also to define the 
role of operative and tactical planning when optimising the use of the technical 
innovations.
The fourth research area studies the influence of joint armed operations 
and joint total national defence operations on information, the exchange of 
information and on the development of information transmission. Changes in 
threats, technological development and internationalisation have roused the 
need to study the action of armed national defence as a part of a more and more 
complex national and international social-technological system. In order to un-
derstand the complex and time-critical functional environment in the future and 
create and direct resources with effective costs, we must know what the role is 
of information passing between the players in the system.
In the fifth research area, the use of simulation methods and simulation 
systems on the development of tactics and on teaching tactical thinking are exa-
•
•
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mined. It is said that war is a laboratory of the art of war. Because wars and bat-
tles are, however, to be avoided, most countries have few realistic experiences of 
the application of military art. Nevertheless, lessons learned from countries that 
have been at war are one method of studying warfare. Because lessons learned 
are, however, relatively rare, simulation is one viable method of studying the art 
of war. Using simulation methods, especially if the parameters are constructed 
on the basis of lessons learned, the basic structures of complex and interactive 
phenomena, critical points and marginal terms can be pinpointed. Accordingly, 
using simulations we can find basic information derived from the background of 
decisions made in different situations, understand realities and develop tactical 
thinking.
The sixth and final research area, which is of great significance, comprises 
methodology of operational art and tactics. Studying methodology is important 
in addition to developing a scientific philosophy of operational art and tactics 
from the viewpoint of research education too. Operational art and tactics as an 
interdisciplinary and multi-method discipline is constantly changing. This poses 
challenges, to which we try to find solutions by following international develop-
ments in operational art and tactics, but also by following the general develop-
ment of methodology in different disciplines. In this way it is possible to produce 
knowledge of new approaches to the research and education of operational art 
and tactics to apply the best possible methods in research.
The third faculty responsible for teaching military art is the Department of 
War History, which is the only research and education unit in the Finnish acade-
mic community that exclusively concentrates on military history. In Finland, the 
term military history is often associated mainly with the history of war events. 
The Department of War History has, however, defined ‘military’ in a more com-
prehensive way to correspond to foreign definitions that also include the history 
of the art of war, history of military institutions, military traditions, and socio-
logical and civic dimensions connected to military matters.
Research and teaching offered by the Department of War History supports 
the teaching of operational art and tactics; in other words, the department focu-
ses its research and teaching on subject areas which produce background infor-
mation for the teaching of operational art and tactics. In addition, the Depart-
ment of War History follows the development of methodology in history. On 
this basis, the research areas of the Department of War History are as follows:
Military history of post-Second World War era from the viewpoint of mili-
tary art
Development of the theory of military art
Finnish military history.11
11 Research at Finnish National Defence University 2005–2008. Passages in this article 
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In these extensive areas, research at the Department of War History concentrates 
on five sectors. The subjects are chosen according to current needs, and the re-
search conducted in these areas and by the department also tries to foreshadow 
the research if possible. The present research areas are as follows:
Development of military art. This sector includes both Finnish and foreign 
military art and theory. A special object of interest is the theory behind pre-
sent-day military thinking
Russian/Soviet military art. This subject area is just one part of a larger en-
tity in which we follow the development of military art in our neighbouring 
countries
Special forces and the principles by which they are used. This sub-research 
is chosen because of the topicality of asymmetric warfare.
History of the Finnish Armed Forces 1944–1974. This is a long-lasting pu-
blication project that will be finished in the course of this year. The book 
will be the second volume in a publication series of the Finnish Armed For-
ces during peacetime.
Influence of the Cold War on military decisions in Finland. This sub-area 
of research is loosely connected to the History of the Finnish Armed Forces 
1944–1974 project, and also to some research projects in Finland concer-
ning the Cold War. In addition there is international co-operation within 
this subject.
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
Education supported by research is the main task at all the faculties at the Natio-
nal Defence University in spite of the fact that our faculties also have their own 
research ambitions. The teaching is based on educational aims that have been 
predefined, but the curricula have been made flexible so they can face the chal-
lenges of the future. On the whole, War Studies forms an ascending entity from 
the candidate’s examination to the general staff officer’s examination.
The Department of Strategy is responsible for teaching theories of stra-
tegy and international and national security issues. The focus of the teaching is 
on Finland’s security environment and international military cooperation. Stra-
tegy and security policy as a discipline include political sciences, security policy, 
economics and strategy.
The Department of Tactics is responsible for teaching operational art and 
tactics. The main aim of the studies is to make student officers prepared for war-
time activities and give them up-to-date theoretical knowledge and high-quality 
practical skills.
The Department of War History analyses war using historical methods. It 
also develops research methods with which to understand the characteristics of 






80 OSLO FILES ON DefeNCe aND SeCurITy 2/2007 War STuDIeS
Bachelor studies in military art prepare students for tasks as instructor and 
specialists in the Armed Forces and Border Guard and to function as company 
(equivalent) commanders in wartime. Basics in military art are the first phase of 
War Studies. The aim of this period is for the students to get an impression of 
the disciplines in War Studies so they can understand the development of mili-
tary art and warfare in a historical context, i.e. as they are now and how they 
might be in the future. In addition, the students familiarise themselves with the 
basic definitions of military art, i.e. strategy, operational art and tactics, and the 
general principles of national military defence.
The basics of military art are followed by studies in tactics. The aim of this 
period is firstly to familiarise the students with elements and tactical principles 
on the battlefield in their own service. The content is then extended to the battles 
of a company (equivalent) in today’s and future battlefields. This period helps 
the students understand how a company functions and is also a base for study-
ing tactics.
In addition, the students familiarise themselves with military elements that 
affect Finland’s security, so that they are able to understand and analyse the is-
sues behind Finnish decision-making in matters of security policy.
Subject studies in War Studies follow the basic studies. Studies in tactics, 
bachelor theses including methodological studies and research seminars, and 
literal exercises form the core of this period. During this phase, the students 
learn about the principles of war and the planning process, after which they 
familiarise themselves with applying the tactics of their own service or branch in 
different situations and environments. The students also practise their skills in 
orientation-decision processes and decision-making. The aim of research studies 
is to familiarise students with research and the methodology of their chosen dis-
cipline and to practise academic argumentation at seminars and prepare to write 
a thesis. In addition, the basics for an academic approach to everyday working 
life are laid down in research studies, i.e. the students will acquire the basics 
with which to analyse independently and critically their everyday work from the 
viewpoint of military art.
Master studies in military art prepares students for the tasks of company 
(equivalent) commanders during peacetime and for officer tasks at company 
level in international tasks, and readiness to wartime officer tasks at battalion 
(equivalent) level in the Armed Forces and Border Guard. The master studies 
mark the beginning of advanced studies in a chosen main subject and secondary 
subject(s). Within War Studies, it is possible to choose advanced studies in three 
disciplines: strategy, operational art and tactics, and military history. Methodo-
logical studies are linked to subject studies, and the final outcome is a master’s 
thesis. This study period is common to all students and begins with a phase that 
assesses the development of military art. The aim is to deepen knowledge of the 
nature and mutual interaction of strategy, operational art and tactics learned 
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during bachelor studies. Students familiarise themselves with the nature and 
development of the modern battlefield, changes in warfare, the development and 
future of the Finnish defence system and with the development of military art 
in Finland and abroad. In addition, students familiarise themselves with topical 
challenges in military art.
After these studies, students who have chosen strategic studies as their main 
subject deepen their knowledge of Finnish security policy and developmental 
tendencies in the European Union, the central contents of Russian military stra-
tegy, and classical realism, liberalism and geopolitics. In military history, discus-
sions about military art are linked to a historical framework and international 
discussion. The students are supposed to learn to understand the historical and 
theoretical background of the battle of services and be able to combine Finnish 
military art with European military art. In studies of operational art and tactics, 
the students extend their skills in tactical thinking by familiarising themselves 
with the planning of action and commandership in different environments at 
battalion (equivalent) level and also take into consideration the current picture 
of war and challenges to the defence system posed by new threats.
Studies in different disciplines in War Studies also support the students’ 
preparations to write a master’s thesis. In addition, the students deepen their 
knowledge of research trends, methods and sources in areas that serve their own 
research and theses. Secondary subjects should be chosen so that they also sup-
port research studies. They deepen interdisciplinary thinking and therefore the 
students choose their secondary subject in our seven faculties so that they can 
support the themes of the theses and methodological choices.
The general staff officer course is an entity in the postgraduate studies in 
our officer education. Officers who have taken a degree in military science will 
be detailed to the staff officer course about ten years after their graduation. At 
the end of the staff officer course, the most successful student officers continue 
their studies on the general staff officer course, which together with the staff of-
ficer course form the first degree in the postgraduate studies of our officers.
The construction of War Studies in our postgraduate programme has not 
yet been completed. At the moment on the staff officer and general staff officer 
course, advanced studies according to chosen main or secondary subjects do 
not yet exist but all officers studying in Army, Navy and Air Force classes have 
the same studies in their own classes. In the future, when bachelor and master 
studies progress and produce experience and demands to develop postgraduate 
studies in officer education, curricula of the staff officer and general staff officer 
courses will also be revised to face the challenges of the Bologna process. In the 
future, our officer education will be an upward-trend entity extending from the 
basic studies at bachelor level to a much deeper understanding of defence sys-
tems on the general staff officer course.
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However, as a subject War Studies already exists also in our postgraduate 
studies, and study periods have been revised to correspond to challenges set by 
bachelor and master studies. On the staff officer course, studies of military his-
tory form the base of strategic, operational and tactical thinking. The students 
familiarise themselves with the thoughts of military theorists from the recent 
past. Strategic studies include basics in Finnish security policy and total national 
defence and critical factors that influence our military-political situation, such 
as important elements in strategy, problems in current research, operative prin-
ciples and the resources of military alliances and means of international crisis 
management. The studies also prepare students for participation in international 
tasks within their own expertise and services. Studies in operational art and 
tactics prepare students for peacetime operational planning tasks in their own 
services and for many wartime tasks in formation (brigade, army corps) head-
quarters, such as chief of operations or branch commanders.
General Staff Officer Studies concentrates on Finland’s total national de-
fence at different phases of a possible crisis. One central point is Finland’s stra-
tegic situation, how it is developing and international security-political coopera-
tion. Student officers also build up the skills for different tasks in international 
cooperation, such as planning and command tasks in exercises and operations. 
The aim of studies in operational art and tactics is that those who have gradua-
ted from the course should have a good command of officer tasks in wartime 
formations, performing both in peacetime and wartime demanding planning, 
development and command tasks in service staffs, in formations and in supreme 
headquarters. Military history supports both strategic studies and studies in 
operational art and tactics by pondering the thinking behind joint operations in 
Finland and abroad.
Postgraduate studies also include a thesis on the staff officer and general 
staff officer course. On the latter, the thesis completed during the staff officer 
course forms the basis of the so-called diploma thesis. Today the themes of the-
ses can be chosen rather freely from within the interests of our faculties, but in 
the future the theses must in general be relevant to the main subject, as is the 
situation already on bachelor and master studies.
The second degree in postgraduate studies in officer education is a doctor’s 
degree. Today we have doctoral studies, excluding one faculty, in all faculties 
and the last one – the Department of Behavioural Sciences – is setting up its own 
programme of doctoral studies. Students apply to our doctoral programmes with 
similar principles as at civilian universities. Today the pre-condition, with some 
exceptions, to get onto our doctoral studies programmes is that the candidate 
must have passed the general staff officer course. In addition, the theme must 
serve the interests of the Finnish Armed Forces. Access to doctoral studies will, 
however, be changed to correspond to the practice of civilian universities so that 
masters of military sciences may also apply to our doctoral studies program-
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mes. What happens to those candidates who have taken their masters degree at 
universities other than the National Defence University remains to be seen. For 
disciplines that apply philosophies of common sciences such as military history 
or military technology, adapting the aims and academic demands should not 
be a problem. In the case of operational art and tactics and perhaps also in the 
case of military strategy, the situation is different because the pre-condition for 
postgraduate studies is the kind of tactical and operative knowledge that can be 
achieved only at the Cadet School at the National Defence University. Whether 
Cadet School might open its doors to civilian students someday also remains to 
be seen.
In addition, foreign students can apply to the programmes of military scien-
ces. We have already had foreign officers at all levels of our officer education, as 
well as on the doctoral programme which today includes three Swedish officers 
who are preparing their doctoral dissertations.
ON LEARNING
In addition to the changing contents of the curricula of our officer education, to 
face future challenges we have been forced to rethink how we can guarantee ped-
agogically that the contents of teaching and research can be accessed. Teaching 
tactical, operative and strategic thinking is no easy task. Teaching military art 
only by lecturing and through military exercises does not meet present or fu-
ture expectations. Today, the starting point is that learning does not happen by 
listening to lectures but by absorbing new knowledge in many different ways. 
Only a deeper understanding accumulated from teaching and learning makes 
it possible to acquire the analytic abilities to study military art both in theory 
and in practice in everyday life. We call this an academic approach to everyday 
working life. Critical study and analysis have a central place in tactical and 
operational exercises as well, where the main emphasis will be more and more 
on teaching tactical and operational thinking instead of learning staff routines, 
which are of course an important skill underlying the application of tactics and 
operational art.
Pedagogically, teaching War Studies is a combination of different types of 
acts of teaching. We still have lectures, because absorbing basic matters which 
are crucial demands the help of lecturers and explanation. At its best, a lecture 
also contains conversation, which helps students shape relevant new perspec-
tives through a combination of guided argumentation and their own views. In 
addition, our students are encouraged to self-guidance in collecting and ana-
lysing sources. They prepare literal exercises both individually and in small 
groups. They write diaries of the things that they have learned, paying special 
attention to how they understand what they have learned and how these details 
are linked to wider entities. Usually, this kind of diary or a part of it can be 
marked as exam papers. In evaluating students, instructors focus on his or her 
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abilities to understand how things are linked together and what kinds of effects 
they have on each other, while remembering details does not have central value. 
Illustrative learning, such as study trips, picture and video material, simulators 
etc., are also used in the teaching when possible. In operational art and tactics, 
exercises are important as they combine theory and practice. Leadership and 
management skills are closely connected to these exercises. On the whole, War 
Studies is constructed so that the trend is upward and from theory to practical 
exercises, where military history forms the ground for learning operational art, 
and tactics and strategic studies give abilities to understand the framework of 
the planning and use of military power. In addition, research studies and rese-
arch seminars support all this by giving our students methods for the academic 
approach to everyday working life.
It is said that science is of age only when it starts to examine its own past 
and development. In this work the National Defence University is in many ways 
merely in the initial stages of its life cycle, when its own cultural traits and sci-
ence philosophies of some disciplines are just forming. War Studies as a subject is 
also still being shaped. Especially challenging in building War Studies has been, 
and still is, the development of the academic traditions of operational art and 
tactics, because this branch of science is, when compared to other disciplines at 
the National Defence University, the most interdisciplinary, and because of its 
military character models cannot be gathered from common sciences. This does 
not, however, mean that we have not studied military art in Finland. We have. 
Our War University and its successor, the National Defence University, have 
performed academic research ever since 1924. Other military schools have also 
been doing research; we have had and still have various research projects headed 
by the General Staff and the General Headquarters, we have research institutes, 
and so on. Many innovations have emerged on the basis of these studies – inno-
vations which have been of value to our Armed Forces during the past decades. 
From an academic point of view, the research into military art and education 
based on this research has been scattered, the nature of military knowledge has 
not been examined, and a systematic academic organisation of military issues – 
above all an exhaustive definition system – has been quite incomplete. Today this 
work has, however, been started. The National Defence University has adopted 
its role as an academic university that according to its best abilities strives to 
show the science community both in Finland and internationally that education 
and research at the Finnish National Defence University meet academic criteria. 
This does not exclude the possibility that while striving towards academic aims, 
we can also produce competent officers and high-quality research. As mentioned 
at the beginning, education according to the Bologna process was started at the 
Finnish National Defence University this autumn. The youngest cadets will fin-
ish after three years. Their Master of Arts studies will begin in 2011. The post-
graduate studies of these young men and women, in other words staff officer 
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and general staff officer studies following the staff officer course, will not start 
until approximately 2015. It goes without saying that new challenges will arise 
on the way from master’s studies to postgraduate studies, challenges that we 
cannot even imagine today. The curricula have, however, already been formed 
so that the subjects take into consideration academic standards and goals at 
each level, and they have been arranged so that the studies form an ascending 
entirety. Flexible curricula are also prepared to face current changes. Therefore 
today we are already planning the content of education. While doing this, our 
instructors also have to make the newest know-how available to the educa-
tional programmes. This is a much more ambitious challenge than has been the 
creation of the framework, the curriculum, where the education is carried out. 
Nevertheless, we have to be open-minded enough to change the platform also, if 
needed. How all this will work out will be seen in the future.

THE FUTURE OF WAR STUDIES IN THE BALTIC STATES 
– “CINDERELLA” OR “PRINCESS”
Professor Tomas Jermalavicius and Asta Maskaliunaite 
Baltic Defence College
INTRODUCTION
War studies, a multi-disciplinary field focusing on all aspects of the phenomenon 
of war, is becoming a fashion in some countries of Europe. There is a growing 
acknowledgment that wars are not going to disappear, no matter how much the 
“de-bellicised” European societies wish that to happen. Pacifist, post-military, 
post-heroic European societies cannot isolate themselves from the turbulent 
world, where the use of force is still seen by many actors as producing political 
benefits. Once hidden behind politically correct euphemisms such as “conflict 
studies” or “strategic studies” or confined to the UK universities, the war studies 
discipline is asserting itself as a field of new opportunities in Europe.
The Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – stand out as an inte-
resting case study to examine the potential of war studies. Their military develop-
ment and tradition were interrupted by the Soviet occupation, which profoundly 
shaped the views of people towards the utility of military force in times of great 
national danger. Their come-back to the international arena was precipitated by 
entirely peaceful resistance in the late 1980s. And their armed services, regene-
rated from scratch, are so small that the population barely registers their exis-
tence, let alone importance to national security. Therefore, these are societies 
deeply sceptical about the value and utility of military force and, consequently, 
about the need to study the main business of the armed forces – war.
However, membership in NATO and the EU, which came at a time when 
both organisations were forced to look far beyond their borders and prepare to 
project military power globally, has altered the strategic framework in which a 
discussion about military force takes place in the Baltics. Their forces are de-
ployed in the regions ravaged by wars and even have to engage in combat. War 
is now a reality for many servicemen and servicewomen as well as their political 
masters, who make commitments to the allies. Does this development warrant 
the emergence of war studies as a separate, independent field of academic studies 
in the Baltic states? Or will research and study of war remain submerged into 
and overshadowed by other related fields such as international relations and 
security studies?
In order to answer these questions we should analyze the current situation 
of war studies in the region and, based on that, see what could be the possible 
drivers and inhibitors for the development of war studies in the three Baltic 
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countries. This idea guides the framework of this paper: we will start with the 
discussion of the institutions and programmes dealing with war studies in the 
region, then move on to discuss the possibilities and obstacles for the advance 
of this area of research.
CURRENT SITUATION OF WAR STUDIES IN THE BALTIC STATES
At the moment, we could say that the situation of war studies in the three Baltic 
countries is pretty bleak. Only a handful of institutions were created during the 
last fifteen years that would deal with security and defence issues. In Lithuania, 
Strategic Research Centre and Centre for Strategic Studies could be mentioned 
in this respect. In Latvia, Baltic Strategic Research Centre under the Academy 
of Science, Defence Research Centre of the National Defence Academy and the 
Latvian Institute of Foreign Affairs are the main centres of research dealing with 
the strategic and security studies. In Estonia, recently the International Centre 
for Defence Studies was established, Foreign Policy Institute has a limited num-
ber of publications on security and strategic issues, and at the National Defence 
College there is some research being done on issues concerning security and 
defence. These research centres, however, are a great deal more concerned with 
different aspects of security studies than with war studies as such. The research 
publications they provide on war studies can be counted on the fingers of one 
hand.
However, there are some indications for a change in this trend. At the 
moment, two programmes in the Lithuanian Universities – MA in Military Di-
plomacy at the Lithuanian Military Academy and MA in War and Peace Studies 
at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius Uni-
versity – are envisioned. The first one already started, the second will take off 
from the academic year 2007/2008. In Latvia a similar programme, an MA in 
Military Science has its title approved already, however, it remains unclear when 
exactly it will be launched. The existence of these programmes creates expecta-
tions that the research in the topics pertaining to war studies will also have their 
place in the academic life of these Universities and Institutes.
What needs separate mention is the Baltic Defence College. Our College 
could currently be considered to be the main driver of war studies in the region 
both in terms of research and in providing academic teaching and expertise in 
the area. Speaking about research, at the moment, in our research plans there 
are five areas, some of them pretty general, that involve people from other insti-
tutions in the Baltic countries. The approved research directions are:
New trends in war and warfare
New security issues and the utility of military force
Strategic culture
Military transformation and defence reforms
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The first direction is envisioned to involve scholars from the Baltic states re-
search institutions in network type research projects on the issues that deal with 
both the theories of the changing warfare, such as the 4th generation warfare 
theory or Effects Based Approach to Operations. Under the second direction we 
supported research by Prof. Lopata on the Kaliningrad region, a book having 
been published in relation to that. Under the third, a book will be published 
dealing with the research by our colleague Margarita Šešelgyte, “The problem 
of European Defence identity” that deals with the strategic culture and identity 
of the European Union.
In the sphere of academic teaching, our college has the connections with the 
MA programmes planned in the other countries, especially those of Lithuania, 
at the moment. The modules that we are offering for the officers at the college 
are incorporated in the MA programmes in Lithuania, so that the officers who 
also want to pursue a Master’s degree can obtain some credit points for their 
studies at the Baltic Defence College.
ENVISIONING THE FUTURE 1: OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF WAR STUDIES
Slow build up of war studies in the region begs an answer as to why this is the 
case; what are the reasons this discipline has such difficulties taking off. Some 
of the reasons are shared by most smaller countries, having participated mainly 
in defensive wars or relying on civil resistance, not developing any sophisticated 
military science. The others, however, are particular only to the special historical 
circumstances that our countries have lived through. Yet other reasons apply to 
one of the countries that comprise the Baltic region (there is no space nor time 
here to get into a discussion whether or not such a term is valid at all) but not to 
the others. Having this in mind, we can structure our discussion of the problems 
that war studies are facing in the Baltics by going from the ones that can be more 
generally applied to small countries as such, to some specific problems in this 
area that the Baltic states face due to their historical legacy and finally discussing 
problems in separate countries.
Talking about the problems that arise in many countries confronted with 
the necessity to develop the discipline, two could be mentioned: first, the parti-
cipation of smaller countries in military operations around the world is a pretty 
new phenomenon, most of them having participated almost exclusively in de-
fensive wars and never creating a very elaborate scientific view of the military 
and its job. The population in these countries is either ignorant of their army 
missions (as in Eastern Europe) or often hostile to them (as in many countries of 
Western Europe). And secondly, there is a resistance to “academising” an out-
wardly purely practical endeavour. Thus, to dedicate scarce resources (financial, 
but especially human) to such a seemingly unnecessary discipline often appears 
to be a luxury these states can hardly afford.
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These problems are evident in the Baltic states as well. However, there 
are also numerous others which are more related to our countries. In analyzing 
these, we have to start from the problems of social sciences in general. The three 
states gained independence and did away with the communist systems only 15 
years ago. The fact that we had the communist systems meant that the social 
sciences in general were in great neglect and, after the changes in regimes, we 
had to start creating them from scratch. Having in mind that most of the educa-
tion in social sciences was limited to the Marxist-Leninist theory, Marxist-Leni-
nist economy, Marxist-Leninist history and other Marxist-Leninist disciplines, 
it took some time to start covering the distance that the social sciences travelled 
in the Western world during the last 50 years. Even such disciplines as political 
science or international relations seemed exotic at the beginning of the nineties, 
and even to the present day most of these sciences are still lagging behind the 
level of the education and research in Western Europe by some 20 years. The 
situation is improving, even though it is hardly possible to expect such leaps 
forward that would allow for the social sciences in the region to be on an equal 
level with their counterparts in such a short time.
One of the reasons for this is the lack even more acute than in other small 
countries of human resources. With the changes that happened after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the regaining of independence for our countries, it ap-
peared that numerous positions at the ministries, bureaucracy, governmental and 
non-governmental institutions, and academia had to be filled in by a very limited 
number of qualified people. Eventually, the same persons act as the advisors to 
presidents and ministers, as public figures and are teaching at the universities. In 
these circumstances, though there are notable exceptions, the research and work 
in the academia suffers and ultimately is abandoned altogether.
Similarly, there is a problem of brain drain. Especially after the entry of our 
countries in the European Union there has been a growing trend of emigration. 
Of course, it is not such a problem with social scientists as it is, say, with doctors 
or interpreters, but if nothing is done to improve the situation, the same fate 
awaits academia. People who are interested in war studies prefer to leave the 
country to study abroad, obviously, because of the higher level of development 
of these studies there, but also, if they intend to engage themselves in academic 
work, they have little incentive to come back to their native countries – jobs in 
academia are poorly paid and any “new” trends are especially looked at with 
great suspicion and irony. The amount of financial resources allocated for re-
search is small in all three countries. The part of it that could be used for the 
further development of war studies is even more negligible.
There are also problems that can be related exclusively to war studies. At 
the moment, the title “war studies” itself, to the ears of the people in our co-
untries, sounds like Tolstoy’s War and Peace, and therefore more like literature 
than a serious academic discipline. This may seem to be a merely semantic issue, 
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but semantics sometimes rules the world and in this case, may rule the finances 
and interests of the people. Thus, if there is any impulse to the development of 
war studies from within the academia, it is more likely to be subsumed under 
different titles, such as conflict studies, or to make up a part of security studies 
because of the resistance to the name itself. One example of this occurred in 
the recent discussions of the Master’s programme in War and Peace Studies of 
the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, 
where some of the opponents argued against the programme precisely because 
of its title.
Also, again as a legacy of the past, there is a problem of mistrust which 
takes on different forms. First of all, due to the Soviet past, society does not look 
very favourably towards the armed forces in the first place. All issues related to 
military and power are looked at with a deep suspicion. Secondly, there is also a 
mistrust of the academia towards the military. This is again related to the Soviet 
past, though it conforms to a pretty widespread tendency in other countries as 
well to view the military as a world apart, a world which has its rules in extreme 
opposition to those that the people within the academic circles cherish. In this si-
tuation, issues related to the military are not considered worth research and even 
the people doing such research are looked at with suspicion as the ones selling 
their souls. Finally, there is also a mistrust of the military towards academics. An 
officer expressed this particularly well when he wrote in one leading magazine of 
the defence community in Lithuania that “military people are practitioners, not 
dry academics.” As long as that is the case, it is hard to imagine that the military 
would seriously consider making use of the academic research.
Even though so far we have talked about the three Baltic states as one 
entity, it must be mentioned that there are differences between the three, and 
there are different approaches to the problems. So far, it could be said that the 
research in war studies has most potential in Lithuania, due to its wider en-
gagements on the world scene in general and in military operations in particular. 
The political sphere and society in the country are also more in favour of the 
pro-active foreign policies, less hostile to the deeper development of the armed 
forces. Finally, the study of international relations, which can be the basis for 
the development of war studies, experienced the greatest growth here. Conse-
quently, there is more interest in research in war studies in Lithuania than in 
other two countries. This can be well exemplified by the launching of the two 
mentioned MA programmes. With this being said, it is time now to look for the 
reasons for optimism in the development of war studies in the region.
ENVISIONING THE FUTURE 2: REASONS FOR OPTIMISM?
The first of the possible drivers of development of war studies in the region 
could be the presence of our armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. These and 
similar missions can stimulate a new perceived need to study the phenomenon of 
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war. Seeing events from close by, it becomes obvious that there is a lack of com-
prehension of the nature of these new wars and the ways to fight them. And the 
need to foster this comprehension is slowly being recognized. Thus, the defence 
community may signal the need for more studies to the academics. This could be 
the main reason why war studies will catch up in the Baltic states.
Demand/supply laws function in the case of science as well. It is obvious 
that if there is no expressed need for more specialists in the sphere of war stu-
dies, there will be no future for those studies either. It could be said that this 
need is now being expressed in at least two of the Baltic countries: Lithuania, 
as we mentioned, already has two prepared programmes that could broadly be 
called war studies programmes, and Latvia is preparing one as well. It remains, 
though, to be seen whether these programmes will be successful, whether they 
will attract enough attention from students and scholars alike so that we could 
say that the new, reversed, trend of interest in war studies has appeared.
Here we should once again mention the role of the Baltic Defence College 
as an initiator and driver in these trends. Currently our College relies to a great 
extent on expertise from outside of the Baltic countries. However, according 
to the initial design, it will have to depend more and more on the potential 
that is there in the Baltic countries. Put into such a situation, the College has a 
great incentive to foster the growth of war studies and, by so doing, to act as a 
constantly barking dog for our defence communities, reminding them of their 
commitments to high level officer education and therefore the need to promote 
the home growth of the specialists in these fields. Though this barking does not 
often go to heaven, eventually, we believe, the need for the creation of a strong 
academic core in order to strengthen the developing of modern, professional 
armed forces will be recognized. This is what our College itself needs. It could 
be reiterated: we will not keep up with our institutional standards if we do not 
manage to promote the scientific research in our countries and rely on the rese-
arch done in the Baltic states themselves.
Having this in mind, the College tries to develop a network of researchers 
who will contribute to the creation of war studies as a discipline in the three 
Baltic countries. By our research initiatives we aim to support the scholars wor-
king in the related fields and foster their interest in turning their gaze also to 
the study of war. Moreover, our project for the research direction on the New 
trends in war and warfare, mentioned above, is organised in such a way as to 
create a meeting point of all those interested in the topic to share ideas and work 
together on a regular basis, communicating between themselves in the virtual 
space between the meetings themselves. Such a framework, we believe, would 
facilitate the creation of war studies as a separate field of inquiry with the num-
ber of scholars dedicating their time to research in the area, following the trends 
of investigation in the world and consequently adding our small, but, hopefully, 
significant input to the war studies field at large.
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CONCLUSIONS
During fifteen years of existence as independent states, the Baltic countries had 
to travel a long way in development of its political, economic systems, institu-
tions and not least, the academic inquiries. War studies appear here as a new, 
unploughed field, which has been under investigation only recently. As can be 
seen from this paper, there are numerous obstacles to the development of these 
studies in the Baltic states. However, even if we do not have a very favourable 
starting point for this development in strategic cultures, traditions are not car-
ved in stone, but exist in the minds of the people and it is the people who can 
change them if they consider that necessary.
We believe that regarding war studies, such a need for change is slowly 
being recognized, and there are steps being made to overcome this long lasting 
disdain for all things military in the academia and vice versa, as a result of which 
we may well see the flourishing of war studies as a discipline in the region. Of 
course, we do not think that these studies may gain prominence in each and 
every one of our states separately and be completely self-sufficient in each of 
them, but that pan-regional and multi-institutional solutions and initiatives, just 
as in the case of staff officers’ education, can well do the miraculous job. In fact, 
due to the lack of financial and human resources a “princess”-like future for 
war studies in the Baltics probably lies in joint degree programmes and “virtual” 
regional war studies centres, not conventional war studies departments within 
the universities or staff colleges. We hope that this new approach to the develop-
ment of the discipline will bear fruits, driving the research on war studies in the 
Baltic states to the heights that were achieved in other parts of Europe.
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